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WHY FINANCIAL REGULATION
KEEPS FALLING SHORT
DAN AWREY *
KATHRYN JUDGE **
Abstract: This Article argues that there is a fundamental mismatch between the nature of finance and current approaches to financial regulation. Today’s financial
system is a dynamic and complex ecosystem. For these and other reasons, policy
makers and market actors regularly have only a fraction of the information that
may be pertinent to decisions they are making. The processes governing financial
regulation, however, implicitly assume a high degree of knowability, stability, and
predictability. Through two case studies and other examples, this Article examines
how this mismatch undermines financial stability and other policy aims. This examination further reveals that the procedural checks on lawmaking meant to promote accountability and legitimacy often fail to further either end. They result instead in excessive expenditures before new rules are adopted, counterproductive efforts to perfect ever more detailed rules, and too little re-evaluation of existing rules
in light of new information or changed circumstances. The mismatch between the
nature of finance and how finance is regulated helps to explain why financial regulation has failed in the past and why it will likely fail again. It also suggests the
need for a new approach to financial regulation, one that acknowledges the limits
of what can be known given the realities of today’s complex and constantly evolving financial ecosystem.

INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the devastation it wreaked on the
United States and other economies triggered a global rulemaking frenzy. In the
United Kingdom, the prudential rulebook for banks ballooned from roughly
400,000 words in 2007 to well over 720,000 in 2017.1 That is the equivalent of
almost one hundred words of new rules per day, each and every day, for a decade. Similarly, in the United States, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the Dodd-Frank Act or Dodd-Frank)
© 2020, Dan Awrey & Kathryn Judge. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
** Harvey J. Goldschmid Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1
Zahid Amadxarif, James Brookes, Nicola Garbarino, Rajan Patel & Eryk Walczak, The Language of Rules: Textual Complexity in Banking Reforms 21–23 (Bank of Eng., Staff Working Paper
No. 834, 2019).
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weighed in at a whopping 364,844 words, or nearly 850 pages. 2 The DoddFrank Act further required eleven different federal agencies—sometimes working alone, other times in conjunction with others—to undertake 243 separate
rulemaking processes and conduct sixty-seven studies. 3 Using techniques from
software programming, Andrew Lo and his co-authors have demonstrated that,
while the average law may not be particularly complex, the Dodd-Frank Act
most certainly is. 4 They also found that Title XII of the United States Code
(U.S. Code or the Code), which governs banks and banking, is second only to
the Internal Revenue Code in its complexity. 5 Moreover, it is complex in ways
that make its failure likely, even before one moves from the Code to the dense
thicket of regulations implementing the statutory scheme. 6
Given that almost a decade has passed since the Dodd-Frank Act and
many other key post-crisis reforms were adopted, this is an opportune time to
assess what we have learned about the processes governing how finance is
regulated. One of the most striking features of the current landscape is just
how much contestation remains. The core aim of all of this new rulemaking
was to promote a more stable and resilient financial system. 7 Yet it is far from
clear whether the system is safer today than it was ten years ago. Global
SRISK, a measure of systemic risk designed by Nobel Laureate Robert Engle
and colleagues, is higher today than at any point in the last twenty years—
including at the height of the financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. 8 Natasha Sarin and Larry Summers have shown that an array
of key metrics of bank riskiness, such as volatility and expected returns, have
not declined following the adoption of post-crisis reforms. 9 In fact, some are
2
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.); see William Li, Pablo
Azar, David Larochelle, Phil Hill & Andrew W. Lo, Law Is Code: A Software Engineering Approach
to Analyzing the United States Code, 10 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 297, 335 (2015) (ranking laws from the
111th Congress by length).
3
DAVIS POLK & WARDELL LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, ENACTED INTO LAW ON JULY 21, 2010, at i (2010), https://www.davis
polk.com/files/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413b-b870-b7c025ed2ecf/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/1d4495c7-0be0-4e9a-ba77-f786fb90464a/070910_Financial_Reform_Summary.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DYB8-37LB].
4
Li et al., supra note 2, at 334.
5
Id. at 343.
6
Dodd-Frank is not alone in earning this dubious distinction. Others in this domain include the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and a number of omnibus bills. Id. at 334.
7
Amadxarif, supra note 1, at 1.
8
Systemic Risk Analysis Summary, V-LAB, https://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/welcome/srisk [https://
perma.cc/RX7Q-BGKF].
9
Natasha Sarin & Lawrence H. Summers, Understanding Bank Risk Through Market Measures,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2016, at 57, 60, https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/02/sarintextfall16bpea.pdf [https://perma.cc/54NG-4KBY].
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even higher today. These metrics suggest that the heightened capital requirements and other reforms have not reduced “the risk of insolvency for major
banks . . . as much as is generally supposed.” 10
More qualitative assessments of the aggregate impact of these reforms are
similarly mixed. 11 The Bipartisan Policy Center, for example, has concluded
that, while the financial system is likely safer today than it was before the crisis, there are still a number of “less-than-optimal outcomes and unintended
consequences of [the] post-crisis reform[s].” 12 Echoing a similar sentiment,
Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics, believes that although the
reforms have been helpful on a number of fronts, the post-crisis reforms targeting banks have spurred a shift in risk-taking to “less regulated, more opaque
part of the financial system.” 13 According to Zandi, it is from this “shadow”
banking system that the next “crisis will likely emanate.” 14 Richard Sylla, financial historian at New York University’s Stern School of Business, puts it
even more bluntly. When asked whether the post-crisis reforms have erected
the guardrails needed to protect against another crisis, he responded: “In a
word, no.” 15
Shifting from aggregate assessments to the impact of specific reforms
does not resolve this contestation. A recent report from the Congressional Research Service acknowledges that even though numerous provisions in the
Dodd-Frank Act were designed to ensure that large financial institutions could
be wound down without threatening the health of the broader financial system,
ten years and a great deal of rulemaking later, “commentators continue to debate whether these provisions have improved the resiliency of the financial
system.” 16 The impact of a new, post-crisis requirement that all standardized
derivatives be centrally cleared has been similarly mixed. The good news is
that the reform seems to have had the intended beneficial effect of improving
transparency in derivatives markets and facilitating multilateral netting in ways
10

Id.
See Emily Stewart, How Close Are We to Another Financial Crisis? 8 Experts Weigh In, VOX
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/9/18/17868074/financial-crisis-dodd-frank-lehmanbrothers-recession [https://perma.cc/U79B-FCLC] (collecting the views of experts on the likelihood of
another financial crisis a decade following the collapse of Lehman Brothers).
12
MARTIN N. BAILY, JUSTIN SCHARDIN & PHILLIP L. SWAGEL, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., DID
POLICYMAKERS GET POST-CRISIS FINANCIAL REGULATION RIGHT? 3 (2016), https://bipartisanpolicy.
org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BPC-FRRI-Post-Crisis-Financial-Regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/
U4RJ-5GK5].
13
Stewart, supra note 11.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
JAY B. SYKES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45162, REGULATORY REFORM 10 YEARS AFTER
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATION OF NON-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1
(2018).
11
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that might reduce contagion and uncertainty in the event that a major financial
institution fails. The bad news is that the resulting concentration of market activity has had the unintended, and quite serious, consequences of creating new
sources of systemic risk and reducing interbank monitoring. 17 Other examples
abound. 18
Our aim here is not to defend or condemn any of the specific reforms put
in place in the aftermath of the crisis. We believe that many have improved the
resilience of the financial system, and we are skeptical of the recent efforts to
roll back the progress that has been made. That said, we see the degree of ongoing contestation about what is working, what is not, and why, as itself important. The devastation that the financial crisis wreaked on the real economy
was unequivocal. In the United States alone, unemployment jumped to ten percent, major stock indices fell by half, and nearly nine million families lost their
homes through foreclosure or related processes. 19 The need for massive reform
was uncontested, even if many of the specific reform efforts were not.
Given the immensity of the public and private resources that have been
brought to bear on the problem of financial fragility, the fact that so many
questions about the impact of the reforms and the health of the financial system linger is itself troubling. Our aim with this paper is to explore how this is
possible. Why has this immense reform effort not produced a demonstrably
more stable financial system? Answering this question not only helps to explain where we are now, but also why financial regulation has so often failed in
the past.
The literature already offers a number of potential explanations for why
financial regulation so often falls short. One explanation, advanced by Roberta
See ALLIANZ GLOBAL INVESTORS ET AL., A PATH FORWARD FOR CCP RESILIENCE, RECOVRESOLUTION 1 (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/pressreleases/current/multimedia/ccp-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U25-UC4X]; Ivana Ruffini, Central
Clearing: Risks and Customer Protections, ECON. PERSPECTIVES, 4Q/2015, at 90 (describing how
changes to regulation of counterparties following the financial crisis gave rise to new sources of risk).
18
See infra notes 124–221 and accompanying notes.
19
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-180, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM:
FINANCIAL CRISIS LOSSES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 17–18 (2013) (“The
monthly unemployment rate peaked at around 10 percent in October 2009 and remained above 8 percent for over 3 years, making this the longest stretch of unemployment above 8 percent in the United
States since the Great Depression.”); Laura Kusisto, Many Who Lost Homes to Foreclosure in Last Decade Won’t Return—NAR, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/many-wholost-homes-to-foreclosure-in-last-decade-wont-return-nar-1429548640#:~:text=Laura%20Kusisto,Biography&text=Less%20than%20one%2Dthird%20of,the%20National%20Association%20of%20
Realtors [https://perma.cc/X58D-GZJU] (“More than 9.3 million homeowners went through a foreclosure, surrendered their home to a lender or sold their home via a distress sale between 2006 and
2014.”); Alexandra Twin, Dow Fights Back, CNN Money (Mar. 6, 2009), https://money.cnn.com/
2009/03/06/markets/markets_newyork/index.htm [https://perma.cc/P3G7-96DC] (“Since closing at
all-time highs on Oct[ober] 9, 2007, the Dow has lost nearly 53% and the S&P 500 has lost 56%.”).
17

ERY, AND
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Romano, is that regulation is too often the byproduct of an impulsive legislative response to a specific scandal or crisis. 20 The net effect, in Romano’s view,
is ill-conceived regulation designed more to quell public outrage than to address underlying problems. A second explanation, rooted in public choice theory, posits that banks and other regulated actors exert too much influence over
the lawmaking process, producing rules that protect their narrow interests at
the expense of the wider public. 21 A third, related explanation stems from the
observation that public pressure to respond to financial crises is often fleeting,
resulting in financial regulation that tends to weaken as the memory of a crisis
fades over time. 22
Each of these accounts helps to explain why financial crises recur so often
and in such familiar ways. Each also sheds some light on why the current reform project has not been more successful. Yet, even collectively, these existing accounts fail to provide a complete explanation for the disconcerting state
of affairs we now face. First, Romano’s account is incomplete insofar as many
of the most contentious post-crisis reforms were developed and proposed not
by Congress, but by far less political, and more technocratic and deliberative,
organizations. Second, an account based in public choice theory does not
square with the fact that many of the unintended consequences of the reforms
pose greater threats to banks than to the public. Finally, the tendency for regulations to weaken over time does not explain the many questions being asked
about the efficacy of the reforms themselves.
This Article expands this list of explanations to include the nature of
modern finance. It shows that another reason financial regulation keeps falling
short—and will again unless revamped—is that the processes through which
finance is regulated are poorly suited to the realities of modern finance. Modern finance is dynamic and complex. In this environment, policymakers inevitably operate with an incomplete understanding of how the financial system
works and how it will respond to regulatory intervention. Exacerbating this
20
See generally Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) [hereinafter Romano, Sarbanes-Oxley] (attributing the shortfalls in the corporate governance reforms contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in part, to the frantic
political environment that followed in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals).
21
Gordon Tullock, Public Choice, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 722,
722–27 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
22
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends
to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1020–37 (2012) (establishing the idea of a “Regulatory Sine Curve,” from which it follows that the appetite for financial
regulatory reform fluctuates based on temporal proximity to market crashes); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Road to Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, 17 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP.
L. 441 (2017) (describing a revived interest in the aftermath of the financial crisis in reconstructing
the structural barriers between commercial banks and capital markets erected by the Glass-Steagall
Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act)).
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challenge is the tendency for the financial system to evolve in ways that minimize the cost of complying with the existing regime, and hence in ways that
tend to involve the movement of activity outside of regulated domains. Tomorrow’s financial system will not look like today’s, and efforts to improve the
stability and functioning of today’s system will be among the factors driving
that change.
Despite the complex and dynamic nature of modern finance, the processes governing how finance is regulated are often rooted in trans-substantive
frameworks designed to accommodate domains that operate quite differently,
or that reflect the static financial systems of a bygone era. The result is processes that implicitly assume that policymakers and other stakeholders understand the system they are regulating and how that system will respond to a given intervention. The consequences of this mismatch are myriad. In addition to
regulations that fail to achieve desired aims, these results include excessive
expenditure of public and private resources before new rules are adopted,
counterproductive efforts to perfect rules, and too little meaningful accountability. We argue that this mismatch helps to explain the ongoing contestation
surrounding the impact of post-crisis regulatory reforms.
In offering a different explanation of the problem, we also advance a different approach for how to fix it. The good news—if it can be called that—is
that finance is far from the only dynamic, complex, and incompletely understood ecosystem in which we are nevertheless compelled to intervene. The
human body is another. Just as morbidity and mortality have declined as doctors have gone from simply treating disease to thinking more broadly about
how to promote health, we suggest that the efficacy and resilience of the financial system could be enhanced by moving away from past efforts to narrowly
address specific market failures and toward a more holistic and health-oriented
approach to finance. We thus conclude by considering what a more holistic
approach to financial regulation might entail and how it could help mitigate the
mismatch that we identify as a core challenge for financial regulation today.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I examines the interrelated phenomena of dynamism, complexity, and unknowns and identifies each as core
features of financial markets and institutions today. 23 Part II provides a stylized
account of how finance is regulated, looking specifically at the core legal processes governing how financial regulation is made. 24 Part III examines this
mismatch in action: using two case studies—post-crisis money market mutual
fund reform and the evolution of bank capital requirements—to demonstrate
what actually happens when legal processes try to keep pace with the speed,
23
24

See infra notes 28–78 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 79–123 and accompanying text.
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complexity, and opacity of modern finance. 25 Part IV examines some of the
recent regulatory reforms, along with proposals for further reform, that can be
viewed as attempting to respond to elements of this mismatch. 26 This examination suggests that although modest progress has been made, there are inherent
limits in trying to use the existing regulatory framework to bridge the growing
gap between finance and financial regulation. In Part V, we present our blueprint for how to start to build a more holistic approach to financial regulation.27
By recognizing the constitutive role of law in finance and embracing a more
holistic mindset, we can devise new ways of analyzing how the law can best
promote resilience and other aims.
I. THE NATURE OF MODERN FINANCE
Crafting effective financial regulation demands that policymakers start with
an accurate understanding of the nature of the financial system and how it responds to regulation. This Part lays that foundation, demonstrating how dynamism, complexity, and unknowns are core features of finance and core challenges for financial regulation. 28 To many, this might not seem controversial. Nonetheless, the current state of financial regulation suggests that this observation has
not been taken to heart. Indeed, while academics, policymakers, and others often
pay lip service to the idea that the financial system is characterized by complexity, dynamism, and pervasive unknowns, most still cling to regulatory frameworks and processes that look increasingly antiquated once we move these features to the center—rather than just the periphery—of finance. 29 Given that it is
the relative importance, not existence, of these features that remains implicitly
contested, our aim here is not only to gesture at them, but to explain why they
ought to front and center in any discussion about how finance is regulated.
A. Dynamism
Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve (Fed) Board of
Governors, recently observed: “What almost overwhelms me in looking at the
world of finance—banking and beyond banking—is how different it is from

See infra notes 124–222 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 223–260 and accompanying text.
27
See infra notes 261–268 and accompanying text.
28
See infra notes 28–78 and accompanying text.
29
See infra notes 79–123 and accompanying text (describing these views).
25
26
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when I was most active.” 30 This subpart explains why that is, why the financial
system is continuing to evolve, and why dynamism is endemic to finance. 31
1. The Cyclical Nature of Finance
One source of constant dynamism is the cyclicality that is built into finance. Stability in finance is not a sign that things are static, but rather, an important driver of structural change. As Hyman Minsky argued nearly fifty years
ago: “[S]ustained economic growth, business cycle booms, and the accompanying financial developments . . . generate conditions conducive to disaster for
the entire economic system.” 32 This occurs because “the structural characteristics of the financial system change during periods of prolonged [economic]
expansion.” 33 Stability breeds inflated expectations that such stability will continue, which drives the very risk-taking that in time will bring it to an end. 34
Economists since Minsky have formalized some of the ways that periods
of stability spur changes in behavior and pricing that contribute to the structural dynamics that he viewed as core. Work on the credit cycle, for example,
shows how changes in the price of assets used as factors of production and as
collateral for loans can accelerate boom and bust cycles. 35 John Geanakoplos
has shown that periods of growth lead to higher leverage, which translates into
higher asset prices, providing a distinct mechanism for built-in cyclicality. 36
Economists have also started offering more institutionally nuanced accounts of
the ways that stability can breed risk-taking. Markus Brunnermeier and Lasse
Pedersen, for example, have shown how interactions between the two sides of
dealer balance sheets can exacerbate cyclicality. 37 The mechanisms formalized
30
Mike Mayo, Paul Volcker on Conflicts, Ethics, and the US Banking Industry, CFA INST.:
ENTERPRISING INV. (Feb. 25, 2019), https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2019/02/25/paul-volckeron-conflicts-ethics-and-the-us-banking-industry/ [https://perma.cc/MVQ4-XCH5].
31
See infra notes 32–59 and accompanying text.
32
HYMAN P. MINSKY, STEERING COMM. FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL REAPPRAISAL DISC. MECHANISM APPOINTED BY BD. OF GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL INSTABILITY REVISITED:
THE ECONOMICS OF DISASTER 1 (1970), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/federal%20
reserve%20history/discountmech/fininst_minsky.pdf [https://perma.cc/82G5-4RU9].
33
Id. at 1–2.
34
See id.
35
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & John Moore, Credit Cycles, 105 J. POL. ECON. 211, 212 (1997); see also
Ben Bernanke, Mark Gertler & Simon Gilchrist, The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality,
78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 1 (1996) (“[C]hanges in credit-market conditions amplify and propagate
the effects of initial real or monetary shocks.”); Arvind Krishnamurthy & Tyler Muir, How Credit
Cycles Across a Financial Crisis 1–6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23850,
2017) (identifying the fluctuations of credit markets and output throughout a financial crisis cycle).
36
John Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle 1–5 (Cowles Found., Discussion Paper No. 1715R,
2010).
37
Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity, 22
REV. FIN. STUD. 2201, 2201–03 (2009).
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in these accounts vary, but each show that the behavior of market participants
and the structures they build are constantly changing, and changing in ways
that may exacerbate fragility.
2. Regulatory Endogeneity
Regulation further contributes to the dynamism and cyclicality of finance.
Most importantly, regulation spurs regulatory arbitrage. As Robin Greenwood
and co-authors explain: “There is no set of ex ante rules, no matter how granular or how sophisticated, that can satisfactorily tackle the problem of regulatory arbitrage . . . .” 38 When government introduces new regulations, the structure of the financial system will inevitably evolve to reduce the costs of compliance.
This dynamic can be observed in the repeated growth of various forms of
“shadow banking.” This term grew in prominence following the crisis, as it
became apparent that many of the early cracks had emanated from a network
of interconnected institutions that collectively engaged in the same type of
credit, maturity, and liquidity transformation as conventional banks. Like
banks, this network funded mortgages and other long-term loans using shortterm debt, with commercial paper, repurchase, or “repo,” agreements, and
money market funds serving as substitutes for deposits. 39 In between these two
ends laid an array of institutions and relationships that functioned largely outside the perimeter of banking regulation. Given the myriad costs associated
with operating a bank, from complying with activity restrictions to ongoing
supervisory oversight and deposit insurance premiums, regulatory arbitrage
was likely among the forces driving the rapid growth of this shadow banking
system in the years leading up to the crisis.
Yet, this was not the first or only shadow banking system. Economic historian Hugh Rockoff has shown that eleven of the twelve financial panics in
the United States between 1819 and 2008 emanated from that day’s version of
the shadow banking system. 40 The Panic of 1907, for example, which led to
the creation of the Fed, erupted in trust companies—bank-like institutions that
38
ROBIN GREENWOOD ET AL., BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, STRENGTHENING AND
STREAMLINING BANK CAPITAL REGULATION 33 (Aug. 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/6_greenwoodetal.pdf [https://perma.cc/9R47-9C7E]; see also Charles W.
Calomiris, Financial Innovation, Regulation, and Reform, 29 CATO J. 65, 65 (2009) (“Financial innovations often respond to regulation by sidestepping regulatory restrictions that would otherwise limit
activities in which people wish to engage.”).
39
See generally ZOLTAN POSZAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 458:
SHADOW BANKING (2012), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/
sr458.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2GZ-3T48] (describing shadow banking).
40
COPING WITH FINANCIAL CRISES: SOME LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC HISTORY 77–106 (Hugh
Rockoff & Isao Suto eds., 2018).
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developed outside a private clearinghouse regime that helped protect banks
from destabilizing runs. 41 Like compliance with any regime—public or private—that promotes the safety and soundness of financial institutions, compliance with clearinghouse rules entailed significant regulatory costs. Those costs
created opportunities for market participants who could find ways to provide
bank-like services without assuming the corresponding burdens.
At least in the United States, there does not seem to be any way to escape
this pattern. The regulatory burdens imposed following the crisis—no matter
how justifiable—will invite yet further evolution and the migration of activity
to less regulated spaces. These developments are already underway. For example, a recent report by the Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center
shows that most home loans are now securitized by government-affiliated entities. 42 And as of June 2018, nonbanks originated sixty-four percent of those
mortgages—a dramatic increase from the pre-crisis era. 43 Nonbanks also provide disproportionately more credit to borrowers with lower credit scores. 44
Other recent reports show that the same thing is happening beyond housing,
and beyond the United States. 45 The significant new regulatory burdens imposed on banks are not stopping the flow of credit; instead, the system is
evolving to provide that credit outside the regulated banking sector.
3. Innovation
Another important driver of the dynamism of modern finance is innovation. These innovations include theoretical insights (like the Black-Scholes
option pricing model), technological developments (like massive increases in
computing power), and the emergence of new financial markets, institutions,
and instruments (like derivatives and structured finance). Indeed, dramatic
change in finance very often entails the combination of all three types of innovation. The almost daily pronouncements about how big data and artificial intelligence are going to “disrupt” finance are merely the most recent manifesta-

41
Id.; see also ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE PANIC OF 1907: LESSONS LEARNED
FROM THE MARKET’S PERFECT STORM 146–47, 161–62 (2007) (describing how trust companies con-

tributed to the economic instability that led to the panic of 1907).
42
See LAURIE GOODMAN ET AL., HOUSING FIN. POL’Y CTR., URBAN INST., HOUSING FINANCE
AT A GLANCE: A MONTHLY CHARTBOOK 31 (July 2018), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
publication/98817/july_2018_chartbook_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF6G-EYBW].
43
Id. at 12.
44
See id. at 13.
45
See Paul J. Davies, Banks and Private Markets: Marking Fresh Connections, WALL STREET J.
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-and-private-markets-making-fresh-connections1533722346 [https://perma.cc/EEC6-R672] (providing an overview of recent trends).
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tions of a continual process of innovation that has been underway for decades,
if not centuries. 46
Consider again the rise of the particular form of shadow banking that
emerged prior to the last crisis. Depending on how one measures it, this system
remains as large as the regulated banking sector. 47 Even if regulatory cost savings propelled part of its growth, shadow banking’s capacity to disperse risks
once concentrated in banks across the financial system may also have had real
efficiency gains, enabling homeowners and others to access more affordable
credit. 48 Neither the regulatory cost savings nor those efficiency gains, however, would have been possible without the myriad of technologies enabling securitization, money market funds, and other key features of this system. These
innovations included creative new uses of legal structures, new modeling techniques, and massive increases in computing power that allowed the collection
and analysis of vast amounts of data about creditor and asset quality.
In the decade since the crisis, innovation has continued apace. In the past
three years alone, more than $120 billion in new capital has been invested
globally in fintech firms. 49 Established banks, too, are investing in innovation.
A recent Citibank report shows that banks spend between 15% and 25% of
their annual budgets on improvements in technology. 50 To put that in perspective, this means that the median spending on technology is higher in the banking sector than in any other single sector—including “high tech” firms. 51 Even
a brief look at the technologies currently changing finance—from the use of

46
See generally CITI GPS: GLOBAL PERSP. & SOLUTIONS, BANK OF THE FUTURE: THE ABCS OF
DIGITAL DISRUPTION IN FINANCE (Mar. 2018), https://www.codex.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/
Bank_of_the_future.pdf [https://perma.cc/39KU-RQUV].
47
Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 VA. L. REV. 411, 415 (2017)
[hereinafter Judge, Information Gaps] (“Recent estimates suggest that the shadow banking system in
the United States is larger than the banking system and poised for further growth.”).
48
Kathryn Judge, Investor-Driven Innovation, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 291, 329 (2018) [hereinafter
Judge, Investor-Driven Innovation] (“One of the most important benefits of investor-driven innovation is its potential to improve price efficiency and reduce the cost of capital for borrowers. For example, by expanding the types of investors who could provide capital to home loans, the innovations just
described should have, and seemingly did, reduce the cost of getting a home loan.”).
49
Chia Tek Yew, Global Fintech Funding Tops US$31B for 2017—Fueled by US$8.7B in Q4:
KPMG’s Pulse of Fintech Report, KPMG (Feb. 13, 2018), https://home.kpmg/sg/en/home/media/
press-releases/2018/02/global-fintech-funding-tops-us-31b-for-2017-kpmg-pulse-of-fintech-report.
html [https://perma.cc/4DXS-NGN8].
50
CITI GPS, supra note 46, at 59 (“IT expenses as a percentage of revenues are notably higher in
the Banking industry than any other (~9%) and almost 2[–]3 [times] those of other major industries.
[Citi’s] bottom-up analysis indicates that approximately . . . 15[–]25% of banks’ annual costs are
allocated to IT.”).
51
See id. (showing median IT expenses for banking at 8.7% and 5.2% for high tech).
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big data and artificial intelligence in assessing creditworthiness 52 to the ongoing experimentation with blockchain as a means of transforming how assets
are held and transferred—suggests significant changes lie ahead. 53
New technologies are already disrupting established institutions in many
emerging markets. The rise of the so-called “shadow payment system”—
institutions that perform core payment functions outside the regulated banking
system—in Asia, Africa, and South America is just one example of how new
technology is changing the face of finance. 54 In China, for example, platforms
such as Alipay and WeChat Pay have each attracted almost one billion users. 55
In Sub-Saharan Africa, meanwhile, over 130 mobile money platforms have
been launched in the decade since the first platform, M-Pesa, was established
in Kenya. 56 Only a few short years ago, technological limitations would have
made these developments almost unthinkable.
4. Radical Change
Dynamism is sometimes incremental and predictable. But sometimes it is
not. The relentless dynamism of the financial system may well result in changes that are hard to even imagine today. Such claims are not just the domain of
technologists. In 2006, it would have likely seemed unthinkable that in a few
short years, of the five leading investment banks—Goldman Sachs, Merrill
Lynch, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Morgan Stanley—one would file
for bankruptcy, another would be acquired on the brink of bankruptcy, a third
would need to be acquired to ensure its survival, and the remaining two would
both choose to become far more heavily regulated bank holding companies.
Yet that is precisely what happened.
Mervyn King, former head of the Bank of England, puts the situation
thusly: “The essential challenge facing everyone living in a capitalist economy
52
See AARON KLEIN, BROOKINGS INST., CREDIT DENIAL IN THE AGE OF AI (Apr. 11, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/credit-denial-in-the-age-of-ai/ [https://perma.cc/WA62-HUBA]
(explaining that, in positive and negative ways, “AI has the power to transform consumer lending”).
53
Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.–Feb.
2017), https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain [https://perma.cc/H2AQ-DJ83] (“Blockchain is a foundational technology: It has the potential to create new foundations for our economic
and social systems.”).
54
Dan Awrey & Kristin van Zwieten, The Shadow Payment System, 43 J. CORP. L. 775, 776–81
(2018) (“[Shadow banking] institutions perform the same core payment functions as conventional
deposit-taking banks . . . [and] reside outside the perimeter of the regulated banking system.”).
55
AARON KLEIN, BROOKINGS INST., IS CHINA’S NEW PAYMENT SYSTEM THE FUTURE? 8 (June
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ES_20190620_Klein_ChinaPayments.
pdf [https://perma.cc/BLJ5-DXGB].
56
GSM ASS’N, THE MOBILE ECONOMY SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 3, 26 (2019), https://www.
gsma.com/mobileeconomy/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/GSMA_MobileEconomy2020_SSA_Eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BQF3-8KEZ].
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is the inability to conceive of what the future may hold. The failure to incorporate radical uncertainty into economic theories was one of the factors responsible for the misjudgments that led to the crisis.” 57 In King’s assessment, this is a
failure that has yet to be corrected—despite the scale and scope of post-crisis
reforms. Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s best-selling book on “Black Swans” makes a
similar point: Our perceptions of the world are inherently limited by our experience and tendency to believe that we understand far more about how the
world works and what it will look like in the future than is possible given the
inherently limited data on which our current understandings are based. 58 As he
explains, “Black Swan logic makes what you don’t know far more relevant than
what you do know.” 59 The crisis helped propel the success of his book because
it was such a powerful example of the phenomenon he helps explain. That so
many of the post-crisis accounts suggest believing in securitization is equivalent to believing in magic or deny that such structures can produce assetbacked securities that are of a higher quality than the underlying loans—and
believe us, they can—exemplifies how core these dynamics are to finance.
B. Complexity
A second defining feature of modern finance is its ever-increasing complexity. Economists Jacopo Carmassi and Richard Herring, for example, have
shown that the average number of subsidiaries controlled by the largest global
banks roughly doubled—to more than one thousand—between 2002 and
2013. 60 Compounding matters, these subsidiaries often operated in different
jurisdictions and typically engaged in a wide variety of different activities. As
a result, they were often subject to oversight by different regulators who do not
necessarily coordinate their regulation or supervision. 61 As Carmassi and Herring explain, these complex and opaque organizational structures both impeded

57
MERVYN KING, THE END OF ALCHEMY: MONEY, BANKING, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 9 (2016).
58
NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE, at
xxii–xxiii (2d ed. 2010).
59
Id. at xxiii.
60
See Richard Herring & Jacopo Carmassi, The Corporate Structure of International Financial
Conglomerates: Complexity and Its Implications for Safety and Soundness, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING 195, 197–201 (Allen N. Berger et al. eds., 2012).
61
Id. at 214–16 (describing the complexity of banking regulation and how financial conglomerates might be forced to “adopt a certain amount of corporate separateness for regulatory purposes”);
see also id. at 209, tbl.8.2 (showing the breakdown of subsidiaries of large complex financial institutions).62 Id. at 216 (“This kind of [regulatory dialectic] has undoubtedly increased the corporate complexity of [large complex financial institutions]. In the event of financial distress, however, this complexity could impede an effective regulatory response.”).
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effective ex ante oversight and greatly complicated crisis management and the
resolution of failing institutions. 62
Complexity is also a key feature of many financial instruments. Using
lexicographic analysis, Claire Célérier and Boris Vallée examined the term
sheets of 55,000 retail structured products issued between 2002 and 2010 to
study how these instruments evolved over time. 63 They found that these instruments were getting more complex over time—with average complexity
increasing substantially prior to the crisis, leveling off between 2007 and 2009,
and then continuing to rise in 2010. 64 They also found that, at least in the retail
market, “product complexity is associated with higher product profitability for
banks and lower performance for investors.” 65
The proliferation of complex instruments can spur fundamental changes
in the structure of the financial system. Securitization illustrates this point.
Traditionally, when banks made loans, they held those loans on their balance
sheets. Securitization allows banks and other originating creditors to instead
bundle these loans together into newly created, bankruptcy remote vehicles. To
fund the acquisition of these loans, the vehicles simultaneously issue brand
new securities, such as mortgage-backed securities or collateralized debt obligations, which entitle the holder to the cash flows from the underlying loans.
These rights are set forth in detailed waterfall provisions that explain how
these cash flows will be distributed among the different tranches of issued securities. Because the underlying loans are inherently unique, so too are the intricate waterfall provisions. The detailed representations and warranties pursuant to which those loans are sold from the originating creditors to the securitization vehicle are also unique and can vary significantly. The aggregate impact
of these contractual provisions, the creation of new legal entities, and the appointment of third parties—such as a servicer to interact with the borrowers
and a trustee to accept cash flows and pay them out according to the waterfall—generates significant new complexities by introducing layers of new information that previously had not mattered to the value of the underlying instruments. 66
62
Id. at 216 (“This kind of [regulatory dialectic] has undoubtedly increased the corporate complexity of [large complex financial institutions]. In the event of financial distress, however, this complexity could impede an effective regulatory response.”).
63
See generally CLAIRE CÉLÉRIER & BORIS VALLÉE, WHAT DRIVES FINANCIAL COMPLEXITY?
A LOOK INTO THE RETAIL MARKET FOR STRUCTURED PRODUCTS (2013), https://www.hbs.edu/
faculty/conferences/2013-household-behavior-risky-asset-mkts/Documents/What-Drives-FinancialComplexity_Celerier-Vallee.pdf [https://perma.cc/EF5Z-CVLV].
64
Id. at 38 fig.3.
65
Id. at 2.
66
See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and
Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 690–93 (2012). See generally Larry Cordell, Yilin Huang &
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The final point to emphasize is that the complexity of securitization vehicles and the ways they redistributed risks mattered. The complexity also increased—by orders of magnitude—the time, effort, and other costs associated
with producing information about the location, nature, and extent of the relevant
risks. 67 As then Fed Governor Randall Krozsner observed during the crisis:
In the old days, we used to know where the risks were; unfortunately, we knew that they were all on the bank balance sheets. With the
originate-to-distribute model and securitization, we have been able
to move to a different model in which the risks are much more dispersed . . . . [I]t leads to potential pockets of uncertainty, and that is
exactly what has come up. 68
This complexity meant that neither market participants nor regulators had a
good understanding of how exposures to subprime mortgages were dispersed
across the financial system. Nor could they readily produce that information
when it really counted. This exacerbated market dysfunction and impeded efforts to contain the growing crisis. 69
The fact that complexity and the resulting information gaps have only increased in the wake of the crisis speaks volumes about how finance works. The
ongoing globalization of finance, the constantly shifting structure of the financial
system, and the fact that market participants can often extract rents from greater
opacity make complexity endemic to today’s financial system. 70 In the view of
Simon Levin and Andrew Lo, “[t]he financial system has crossed a threshold of
complexity where the system is evolving faster than regulators and regulations

Meredith Williams, Collateral Damage: Sizing and Assessing the Subprime CDO Crisis (Fed. Reserve Bank Phila. Working Paper No. 11-30/R, 2012), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/
research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2011/wp11-30.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KT5-B6YD]
(describing the complex and heterogeneous structure of securitization contracts and markets).
67
See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in Information Thicket: A Case Study of Derivative
Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 1, 55–56 (2010); Cordell, Huang & Williams,
supra note 66.
68
Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on September 18, 2007, FED. RES., https://
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20070918meeting.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LFFEYGK].
69
See Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 47, at 477; Kathryn Judge, The First Year: The Role
of a Modern Lender of Last Resort, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 843, 913 (2016).
70
See generally Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial
Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235 (2012).
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can keep pace.” 71 This view is echoed by Professor Steven Schwarcz, who argues that complexity is “the greatest financial-market challenge of the future.”72
C. Unknowns
The complexity of modern finance makes it prohibitively costly for market participants and regulators to gather, much less analyze, the entire universe
of potentially relevant information. As a result, these actors almost invariably
operate with only a fraction of the information that may be pertinent to the decisions they are making: relying instead on proxies—from ratings to reputation—to fill in the gaps. Dynamism accentuates this challenge. Information
that is accurate at one point in time may not be accurate at another. Frictions
that limit access to information further exacerbate the pervasiveness and size
of information gaps. Counterparties can choose what information they will
share, and what they will not. Different regulators have different jurisdictions,
mandates, and objectives, limiting both the scope of their authority and their
field of vision. The creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC) and Office of Financial Research (OFR) in the United States has
helped mitigate some of these frictions but has far from eliminated them. More
importantly, given the incredible complexity and dynamism of finance, together with the finite resources of regulators, high information and other costs remain a powerful constraint on who knows what at any point in time.
Apart from these large information gaps, a second factor exacerbating unknowns is uncertainty. Finance is about risk. But as Frank Knight long ago
explained, not all future events can be understood in probabilistic terms. 73 Specifically, there are categories of things that might happen—good and bad—that
are simply beyond our collective imagination. These are Donald Rumsfeld’s
“unknown unknowns.” 74 These events encompass the “radical uncertainty”
that Mervyn King describes. 75 They also encompass changes that are subtler in
71
Simon A. Levin & Andrew W. Lo, Opinion: A New Approach to Financial Regulation, 112
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12,543 (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/112/41/12543.
full.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3Z7-9E8C].
72
Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211,
213 (2009).
73
See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 232–33 (Cosimo Classics 2006)
(1921); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 282 (rev. ed. 1976) (“In his seminal work, Frank
Knight drew a sharp distinction between risk, as referring to events subject to a known or knowable
probability distribution and uncertainty, as referring to events for which it was not possible to specify
numerical probabilities.” (emphasis omitted)).
74
Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 47, at 417–18 (“The risk-uncertainty dichotomy is useful
because there are tools that can be used to manage risks that are not available when one is confronting
an ‘unknown unknown.’”).
75
See KING, supra note 57, at 120.
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character but no less beyond our comprehension. This uncertainty opens the
door to the possibility that tomorrow will look very different from today.
As if information gaps and uncertainty were not challenging enough, failures of interpretation can further undermine understanding. It is not just that
dynamism renders new information stale—it also undercuts the value of the
frameworks we use to interpret this information. Both policymakers and market actors often view information through a lens colored by an outdated understanding of the financial system. As explained by Richard Clarida, now Vice
Chair of the Board of Governors of the Fed: “it would seem that the supervision and regulation of [U.S.] investment and commercial banks during the
great moderation was based on an assumption about how the financial system
was supposed to work, not upon sufficient knowledge about how the financial
system actually worked.” 76 Prior to 2008, policymakers and academics alike
were fooled into believing that the system had become more stable at the precise moment that massive new forms of systemic risk were growing unchecked. Banks looked well capitalized, and while regulators were well aware
of each of the component parts of the shadow banking system, no one seemed
to fully appreciate how the complex interdependencies between these parts
exposed them to the same type of destabilizing runs as conventional banks. 77
The point here is not only that dynamism and complexity create unknowns; it is that economists, policymakers, and others are often ill-equipped
to assess what they know and what they do not. This is not a challenge specific
to these groups, but rather one common to all experts—and one they regularly
fail to appreciate. As Philip Tetlock and Dan Gardiner explain, “absence of
doubt” can be detrimental to good decision making, particularly in complex
and changing environments. 78 By failing to appreciate the limits of what is and
can be known, current approaches to financial regulation may be discounting
the most important features of modern finance.
II. HOW FINANCE IS REGULATED
So how do the complexity, dynamism, and unknowns of modern finance
compare with the current processes through which finance is regulated? This
Part presents a highly simplified, and in many ways stylized, account of these
76
RICHARD H. CLARIDA, WHAT HAS—AND HAS NOT—BEEN LEARNED ABOUT MONETARY
POLICY IN A LOW INFLATION ENVIRONMENT? A REVIEW OF THE 2000S, at 9 (Oct. 12, 2010), https://
www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/conference/55/papers/Clarida.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/
CLW7-ZBBH] (emphasis omitted).
77
See GARY GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON’T SEE THEM
COMING 3–4 (2012); POSZAR ET AL., supra note 39, at 1–2.
78
PHILIP E. TETLOCK & DAN GARDNER, SUPERFORECASTING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PREDICTION 30 (2015).
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processes. 79 In this respect, our aim is to capture the essence of these processes, rather than their technical nuance.
A. International Financial Regulation
Financial regulation frequently starts at the international level. Beginning
in the 1970s, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system 80 and the increasing
globalization of finance spurred the creation of several international organizations designed to foster greater cross-border regulatory coordination. These
organizations included the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel
Committee), the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, and the
International Organization of Securities Commissions. In recent decades, these
organizations have come to play an important role in setting international
standards in areas such as bank capital, liquidity, and supervision, payment
infrastructure, and securities regulation and enforcement. 81 In the wake of the
financial crisis, these organizations, alongside the G20 and Financial Stability
Board, have often taken the lead in setting the global regulatory agenda. 82
The Basel Committee, created in 1974, is among the most influential of
these international organizations and embodies the way international financial
regulation works today. Members of the Basel Committee include the central
bank governors and national bank supervisors of the G20 member states. 83 Its
“mandate is to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks
worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability.” 84 Although it
purports to provide a three-pillar approach focused on bank capital, supervision, and market discipline, its rules regarding capital and liquidity are probably the most important in shaping and constraining lawmaking at the national
level. The first Basel standards (Basel I) were published in 1988, after almost a

See infra notes 79–123 and accompanying text.
The Bretton Woods System was based on an international agreement between states that regulated the international monetary system.
81
See Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 GA.
L.J. 257, 259–60 (2011) (providing a detailed description of the different roles played by these organizations).
82
Id. at 259.
83
In total, the Basel Committee currently has forty-five members from twenty-eight jurisdictions.
The Committee also has nine “observers” drawn from central banks, supervisory groups, and other
international organizations. Basel Committee Membership, BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS [BIS],
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm [https://perma.cc/PKW2-RL6N] (last updated Dec. 30,
2016).
84
Basel Committee Charter, BIS, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm [https://perma.cc/5A8ZEABY] (last updated June 5, 2018).
79
80
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decade of protracted negotiations among its ten original member states. 85
These were followed by a series of technical amendments leading to the publication of Basel II in 2004. 86 Basel II was itself still being implemented when
the crisis of 2007–2009 prompted a fundamental overhaul of the Basel framework under what would become known as Basel III. 87 Published in 2010, Basel III was intended to be fully implemented by January 1, 2019. 88
The Basel Committee’s role in developing global banking standards reflects the work of other international organizations in several key respects.
First, these organizations typically enjoy few, if any, formal legal powers, relying instead on negotiation and consensus to develop and promote the adoption
of non-binding standards. 89 Second, while politics plays a role in shaping their
agenda and setting their standards, the process by which these organizations
develop and refine these standards is highly technocratic. 90 Third, reflecting
both the political and technocratic nature of these organizations, the development of these standards is often a slow, deliberative, and incremental process.
Finally, despite the absence of formal legal power—or perhaps because of it—
these organizations have been relatively successful in promoting the adoption
of international standards in a number of important areas. 91 By 2015, for example, over eighty jurisdictions—including the United States—had announced
their intentions to adopt one or more of the core elements of Basel II. 92 Ultimately, of course, the power to incorporate these international standards into
law still rests in the hands of domestic policymakers.
85
See generally CHARLES GOODHART, THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION: A
HISTORY OF THE EARLY YEARS 1974–1997 (2011) (providing a detailed history of the Basel Committee and the negotiations over Basel I).
86
See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION [BCBS], INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE
OF CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (Nov. 15, 2005), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs
118.pdf [https://perma.cc/72DB-XSBC]. Significant amendments to Basel I that preceded the publication of Basel II included the 1996 “Market Risk” Amendment. See BCBS, AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD TO INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS (Jan. 1996), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs24.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6K75-VYKJ].
87
See BCBS, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS
AND BANKING SYSTEMS (rev. June 1, 2011) (2010), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XKA8-JGU3] [hereinafter BCBS, BASEL III GLOBAL FRAMEWORK]; BCBS, BASEL III:
FINALISING POST-CRISIS REFORMS (2017), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf [https://perma.
cc/2YS6-BZ6G] [hereinafter BCBS, FINALISING POST-CRISIS REFORMS].
88
See BCBS, BASEL III GLOBAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 87, at 69 annex 4.
89
See Brummer, supra note 81, at 261 (noting that international financial rules are largely created
through agreements that are not legally binding).
90
See id. at 279.
91
Viewed from this perspective, the fact that these standards are non-binding makes the resulting
commitments less costly from the perspective of jurisdictions contemplating their adoption, thereby
increasingly the likelihood that they will be adopted. See id. at 284.
92
See BIS, FIN. STABILITY INST., FSI SURVEY—BASEL II, 2.5 AND III IMPLEMENTATION (June
29, 2015), https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsiop2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NB2-VYY3].
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B. Statutes
In the United States, the backbone of all financial regulation is the U.S.
Code. The U.S. Code consists of all the statutes ever adopted by Congress, including any amendments or modifications to earlier statutes. Title XII of the
Code addresses banks and banking, while other core elements of financial regulation, like securities regulation, are codified elsewhere. 93
The process of making new laws, or modifying existing ones, begins
when a member of Congress introduces a bill with her proposed changes to the
law. That bill is then referred to a specialized committee, and perhaps from
there to a subcommittee. The committee may then hold hearings and discuss
the bill, along with other bills on related matters. A small subset of the bills
introduced emerge from this process, and those that do are often modified in
the process. A bill that is approved by a majority of committee members is then
slated for consideration by the full body. The processes are somewhat different
in the House and Senate, but both generally involve further debate and hearings that are possibly followed by a vote. When both chambers manage to approve similar bills—they usually approve different versions—the next stage
involves reconciliation hearings and a compromise text that must again be approved by a majority of voting members of both houses of Congress. That bill
must then be signed into law by the President or, if he vetoes the bill, approved
by two-thirds of the voting members of each house. 94
The aims of these procedures are myriad. The overarching aim of the requirement that laws be passed by democratically elected officials is to promote
accountability and responsiveness to the public. The unique form of republican
governance embodied in the Constitution then seeks to accommodate the many
practical challenges that arise in trying to serve the will of the people. The requirements of bicameral approval and presentment set forth in the Constitution
are among the checks and balances that help address the fact that government
officials are fallible. 95 The use of committees and other procedural rules also
serve a number of other aims: from allowing Congress to more effectively
manage the many issues subject to federal regulation, to enabling some degree

93
E.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–9001 (2018) (generally outlining the authority of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–9080 (2018) (containing most federal securities laws administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)).
94
How Laws Are Made and How to Research Them, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/how-lawsare-made [https://perma.cc/LN48-DEW8].
95
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control
the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”).
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of specialization among members. 96 Lawmaking has never been about a firstbest process, but one that entails a range of tradeoffs.
The frictions that arise from these checks and balances are considerable
and, in practice, have grown in recent years. 97 These frictions are exacerbated
by the use of committees and other procedures. Political scientists have conceptualized the process using a “vetogate model” that highlights the numerous
points at which a potential bill can be derailed. 98 Unorthodox legislation, from
emergency legislation passed with far less process or debate to “long and
messy” omnibus bills, is increasingly common. 99 By the same token, legislative vetoes in which Congress effectively overrides the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a statute—a sign that Congress is functioning effectively—are on
the decline. 100 And perhaps most discussed, though still contested, is the way
increased partisanship may be hampering Congress’s capacity to get anything
done. 101 Nonetheless, these processes remain deeply embedded and recent developments seem more likely to exacerbate than reduce these tensions.
C. Rulemaking
Today, most statutes are not complete or self-executing proclamations of
the law. Instead, they delegate significant authority to administrative agencies
to make rules and otherwise implement the regimes set forth in statute. The
Dodd-Frank Act, a detailed, prescriptive piece of legislation totaling 849 pages, is a case in point. 102 Within that text, Congress explicitly requires eleven
different agencies to produce, collectively, 243 new rules, sixty-seven one-time
reports, and twenty-two new periodic reports. 103 Among the reasons for this
delegation is the desire to harness the technocratic expertise housed within the
96
Herbert B. Asher, Committees and the Norm of Specialization, 411 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 63, 63 (1974).
97
See Derek Willis & Paul Kane, How Congress Stopped Working, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 5, 2018),
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-congress-stopped-working [https://perma.cc/EWR5-Z554].
98
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 53–55 (5th ed. 2014). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates and American Public Law, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 756 (2012).
99
See Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1789, 1803 (2015).
100
Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2014).
101
SAM ROSENFELD, THE POLARIZERS: POSTWAR ARCHITECTS OF OUR PARTISAN ERA 3 (2018);
Thomas E. Mann, Admit It, Political Scientists: Politics Really Is More Broken Than Ever, THE ATLANTIC (May 26, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/dysfunction/371544/
[https://perma.cc/Q6JK-SXTJ].
102
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
103
DAVIS POLK & WARDELL LLP, supra note 3, at ii.
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federal agencies responsible for administering, monitoring, and enforcing financial regulation.
Like statutory law, the process of introducing or modifying regulations involves numerous procedural requirements. Most of the default procedures that
agencies must follow are set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 104
The APA requires that before implementing or modifying a regulation, an agency
generally must publish its proposed rule, along with background and explanatory
materials, and invite public comment on that proposal. 105 For matters of financial
regulation, the most thorough and relevant letters are often provided by banks
and other financial market participants who will be subject to the regulation.106
The agency will then respond to the substantive issues raised in those comment
letters when issuing its final, often revised, rule.
Like statutory lawmaking, these processes serve numerous purposes. As
explained by Cass Sunstein, “[d]emocratization of the regulatory process,
through public comment, has an epistemic value.” 107 According to Sunstein,
the public comment requirement “helps to collect dispersed knowledge and to
bring it to bear on official choices.” 108 In addition to being aimed at improving
the quality of the rules finally issued, this extensive and resource-intensive
process is also designed to enhance transparency and accountability, allowing
the public to participate in and understand the reasons behind agency rulemaking.
Just as with legislation, there is evidence that the regulatory state often
deviates from this stylized model. Indeed, there is a growing chorus of administrative law scholars drawing attention to the ways these procedures may actually inhibit effective regulation. Perhaps most importantly, adherence to strict
procedural rules ostensibly designed to confer legitimacy and improve substantive rulemaking may exhibit a pronounced status quo bias. Compliance with
procedural requirements almost by necessity involves delaying regulatory action. It also saps agency resources, making it more difficult for agencies to take
the initiative and respond to new developments. When combined with the nature and pace of change in fields such as finance, this status quo bias is not
104
See generally Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
105
5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).
106
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of Financial
Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 58 (2013).
107
ADAM LOONEY, BROOKINGS INST., HOW TO EFFECTIVELY COMMENT ON REGULATIONS 3
(Aug. 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ES_20180809_RegComments.
pdf [https://perma.cc/3AGY-GUTD] (quoting Cass Sunstein, Democratizing Regulation, Digitally, 34
DEMOCRACY J. (Fall 2014), https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/34/democratizing-regulationdigitally/ [https://perma.cc/DVB5-22QV]).
108
Id. (quoting Sunstein, supra note 107).
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politically neutral. Rather, these procedural requirements can tip the political
scales in favor of those who wish to limit state intervention—undercutting the
legitimacy of the regulatory process and foreclosing potentially desirable policy alternatives. As Nicholas Bagley argues, the procedural “fetish” in U.S. administrative law may thus undermine the very aims it was designed to
achieve. 109 In part because of these concerns, other administrative law scholars
are laying a critical foundation for thinking more broadly about the type and
site of procedures that can confer the needed accountability. 110 Nevertheless,
this procedural framework remains mandatory and entrenched. 111
Compounding matters, financial regulators often do, and sometimes must,
undertake cost-benefit analyses (CBA) of proposed regulations. 112 In addition
to shaping the nature of an agency’s deliberations, CBA can add significant
costs and introduce other impediments to the rulemaking process. 113 Even
where it is not strictly followed, CBA also reflect an extreme version of the
assumption underlying so many of the procedural rules used in financial regulation: that it is possible to know, or at least make reasonably well-informed
assessments of, the myriad effects a regulatory intervention will have on financial markets and institutions. That leading academics in the law and economics
movement have decried CBA as counterproductive in the domain of financial
regulation suggests that processes that may sound reasonable and helpful in the
abstract can be misguided when applied formulaically in the process of regulating finance. 114 Again, however, those processes remain entrenched and are
widely supported.
A final source of friction that is particularly pressing in finance arises
from the architecture of the regulatory system. 115 In the United States, this arNicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345, 369 (2019).
See generally Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH.
L. REV. 1239 (2017).
111
See Gluck, O’Connell & Po, supra note 99, at 1792; David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187, 203 (2010).
112
The White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs oversees the CBA for rules issued by executive agencies before the agencies submit them the public for comment. Exec. Order. No.
12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). Most financial regulators are independent and hence not
subject to this requirement, but some commentators and courts take the position that certain financial
regulators are required to undertake quantified, judicially reviewable CBA when promulgating new
rules. John Coates provides helpful background and a very useful critique of such requirements. See
generally John C. Coates, IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882 (2015).
113
See Coates, supra note 112, at 888.
114
See id. at 888–89; see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S351, S353 (2014).
115
See generally Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012) (describing the fragmented nature of the U.S. regulatory scheme and
its impact on rulemaking generally).
109
110
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chitecture is a byproduct of a time when banking, capital markets, and insurance were largely distinct. This historical anachronism has left the United
States with two federal market regulators, three federal bank regulators, and no
federal regulation of insurance, which instead is overseen primarily by the fifty
states. There are also a number of specialized regulators, such as the Federal
Housing Finance Agency, that oversee the government-sponsored entities that
provide support to U.S. housing markets. Sometimes, new rules are promulgated by multiple agencies working together. The Volcker Rule, for example, required coordination among five different agencies and moved forward more
slowly as a result. 116 More often, each agency continues to shape how it perceives and addresses challenges, and most agencies remain focused on problems
that fall clearly within their jurisdiction, thereby reducing the amount of attention paid to developments within the financial system as a whole, or the ways
actions by one agency may cause problems under the domain of others. 117
D. Supervision
In addition to being subject to the many rules promulgated through the
processes described above, banks and many other financial institutions are subject to ongoing supervision. Supervisors assess compliance with applicable
regulations, but they have also long enjoyed a broader mandate to promote the
“safety and soundness” of supervised entities. This seemingly broad authority
is justified both on the grounds that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) insures deposits at all regulated banks and that bank failures have adverse spillover effects. After the recent crisis, there have also been efforts, most
notably through regular stress testing, to make bank oversight and the rules to
which banks are subject more dynamic and forward looking. These are important components of financial regulation, and ones that can help mitigate the
mismatch between the dynamism of finance and the efforts to govern it using
static rules.
Despite its seeming breadth and flexibility, supervision is mentioned last
and only briefly because, in practice, it serves more to implement than complement current regulatory frameworks. As the trajectory of financial regulation in the United States has been one of ever more finely tuned rules through
116
See Keith R. Fisher, Volcker Rule Agencies Issue Interim Final Rule Exempting TruPS-Backed
CDOS, 67 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 337, 395 (2013).
117
See Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 47, at 427–35 (explaining the differences between
prudential and market regulators and how the lenses used by each tend to limit the types of challenges
they see and the tools they bring to bear). Notably, these divisions and biases can persist through personnel and intra-organizational design, even when the regulatory architecture is redesigned to try to
address these dynamics. See generally Dan Awrey, The FSA, Integrated Regulation, and the Curious
Case of OTC Derivatives, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1 (2010).
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the processes just described, supervision has evolved from a tool that gave
regulators broad discretion to identify emerging problems to a process that is
too often focused on ensuring the trees are in order without much attention to
the broader forest of which they are a part. 118 This was all too clear both before
and after the recent crisis. And supervisors are among the most likely to use
outmoded frames for understanding the risks before them, thus limiting the potential practical benefits of broad supervision right when it is most needed. 119
E. Where Does This Leave Us?
Two key policy objectives underpin the costly, complex, and lengthy processes governing how financial regulation is currently made in the United
States. The first is to promote legitimacy and accountability. The second is to
ensure that new rules will be effective: that they will achieve a desired aim,
and, ideally, that they are well-tailored to that aim.
Moving the dynamism, complexity, and unknowns of modern finance
center stage, however, reveals how ill-suited these processes are to achieve
those aims. As a threshold matter, these processes are only triggered when
there is a perceived problem. Sometimes this is a shortcoming exposed by a
scandal or crisis, and other times it is regulated actors or other affected parties
advocating for a change. 120 Economists, together with the more technocratic
policymakers they seek to inform, use different language, but often similarly
focus on problems in isolation. “Market failures” are their diagnostic tool of
choice: placing problems into established frameworks such as agency costs,
information asymmetries, coordination problems, or externalities. 121
118
See infra notes 223–257 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons that rules are used so
extensively despite known weaknesses in their efficacy).
119
See CLARIDA, supra note 76, at 23 (explaining the problems arising from “the pre–crisis consensus for the supervision and regulation of financial markets by the Fed, . . . the SEC, FDIC, Comptroller of the Currency, [and] FHFA” (emphasis omitted)).
120
Whether and to what extent financial crises drive regulation is a matter of contestation. Compare Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark and a Postscript Assessment of the Iron Law of Financial Regulation, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 25, 25 (2014) (arguing that “foundational financial legislation
tends to be enacted in a crisis setting”), with Peter Conti-Brown & Michael Ohlrogge, Testing the
Crisis-Legislation Hypothesis: Citation Indexing and the Measurement of Legislative Importance, J.
FIN. CRISES (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 5) (empirically challenging Romano’s assessment and
showing that a significant portion of banking regulation is in fact enacted outside of crisis periods).
121
These market failures are the subject of an enormous body of economic scholarship. See, e.g.,
George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84
Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (describing information and adverse selection problems); R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (explaining the concepts of public goods and externalities); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (detailing agency problems in the
context of firms); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Ex-
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By focusing on specific market failures or other perceived flaws, this approach often results in discussions of issues divorced from the broader ecosystem within which they are situated. The net result is a policy process that too
often ignores the complex interconnections between financial markets and institutions, the potential second, third, and fourth order effects of regulatory
intervention, and the limits of what policymakers can know and understand. In
short, current processes do not encourage, and may well discourage, attention
to the bigger picture.
Accentuating the challenge, the collective inertia generated by these procedural requirements introduces a significant status quo bias into the policy
process. Finance moves faster than financial regulation, and the procedural
requirements meant to promote the public interest can be used by regulated
actors to influence the direction of the policy process in self-serving ways. The
status quo bias generated by these procedural requirements thus typically has a
decidedly deregulatory impact.
Lastly, where the policy process does result in the introduction of new
rules, current processes envision that these rules will remain in place even if
the specific problems they were designed to address no longer exist. And
where new problems do emerge, they are typically addressed through new interventions—that is, new rules. Importantly, the resulting accretion of rules can
even be observed during periods of supposed “deregulation.” Indeed, as Helen
Garten has documented, much of the deregulation that occurred in banking in
the 1980s took the form of increasingly detailed and more expansive rules,
each permitting banks to do a little more than they were previously able to do,
subject to yet additional restrictions on where within their organizations they
could undertake new activities. 122 Paradoxically, deregulation has thus increased the complexity of both financial institutions and financial regulation. 123

change, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983) (describing asset-specific investment and the resulting holdup problems).
122
HELEN GARTEN, WHY BANK REGULATION FAILED: DESIGNING A BANK REGULATORY
STRATEGY FOR THE 1990S, at 3 (1991).
123
This trend is not unique to finance. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great
Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1325 (1998) (arguing that
“the changes taking place in regulated industries law” during the 1980s and 1990s are better understood as a change of paradigm than “in terms of ‘regulation’ versus ‘deregulation’”). Much of the
supposed deregulation, like the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which included more than “100
pages of new regulatory requirements [and] directs the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
to commence more than a dozen rulemaking proceedings,” did not result in less regulation in the colloquial sense of the term. Id.
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III. FINANCIAL REGULATION IN PRACTICE
Our discussion thus far has taken place at a fairly high level of abstraction. Yet even at this level, there appears to be a meaningful tension—a mismatch—between the core features of the financial system as a domain characterized by complexity, change, and pervasive unknowns, and regulatory processes that assume a high degree of knowability, stability, and predictability in
designing rules that are both effective and legitimate in the eyes of the public.
This Part moves us closer to the ground in order to demonstrate that this
mismatch is not just some theoretical problem, but a concrete and pressing
challenge. 124 It begins with two case studies. The first involves rulemaking by
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in response to
the runs on money market mutual funds at the height of the financial crisis.
The second involves the sweeping post-crisis reforms to the international capital and liquidity rules for banks spearheaded by the Basel Committee. To address any concern that we have cherry-picked these examples, this Part concludes by looking at how similar challenges are afflicting other post-crisis reforms. The aim is not to critique any individual reform, but to assess the extent
to which the extensive processes through which they were developed achieved
their desired aims.
A. Money Market Mutual Fund Reform
Money market mutual funds—or simply “money market funds”—are investment funds that invest in cash and other money market instruments. As the
name suggests, these funds provide investors with a “money-like” investment:
one that is safe and can be relied on to hold its value. 125 The existence of these
funds is a byproduct of idiosyncrasies in how the United States historically
regulated banks and markets. Following the Great Depression, Congress introduced deposit insurance for banks, while also imposing significant restrictions
on what banks could do and how they could do it. This included restrictions,
embodied in Regulation Q, on the interest rates that banks could pay depositors. 126 This system worked well for several decades. 127 When interest rates
rose significantly in the 1970s, however, depositors were less content acceptSee infra notes 124–222 and accompanying text.
Kathryn Judge, Regulation and Deregulation: The Baseline Challenge, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE
101, 105 (2018), http://www.virginialawreview.org/volumes/content/regulation-and-deregulation-baselinechallenge#top-link-26 [https://perma.cc/8QE5-FNCP].
126
See generally Charlotte E. Ruebling, The Administration of Regulation Q, FED. RES. BANK ST.
LOUIS REV. (Feb. 1970), https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/review/70/02/Administration_
Feb1970.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y93-WUC].
127
GORTON, supra note 77, at 27.
124
125
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ing little or no interest in exchange for the safety and liquidity that bank deposits promised. 128 Money market funds emerged to fill this gap. A product of
both private creativity and an accommodating regulatory environment, money
market funds offered higher returns than bank deposits. They grew quickly—to
the detriment of banks’ liquidity positions—leading in turn to the demise of
Regulation Q. 129 Nonetheless, because banks were still subject to costly regulation, demand for money market funds continued to grow. Throughout, money
market funds were aided by SEC regulations that permitted them to use a fixed
$1.00 net asset value (NAV) in exchange for abiding by significant restrictions
on the duration and quality of the assets they were allowed to hold. 130
Over time, money market funds’ growth changed how banks and other
firms funded themselves, as highly rated issuers came to rely on them as ready
buyers of any short-term debt they might issue. All seemed well enough until
the failure of Lehman Brothers (Lehman) in September 2008.131 Lehman’s collapse caused one of the oldest money market funds to “break that buck,” redeeming some of its shares at less than the expected $1.00. Within a week, investors had withdrawn approximately $300 billion from non-government, or
“prime,” money market funds, leading to massive disruptions in the short-term
funding markets. 132 The Fed and Treasury Department quickly intervened, with
each creatively stretching their legal authority to do so. 133 These interventions,
particularly the guarantees provided by Treasury, had the desired effect of restoring faith in money market funds and restoring functionality to short-term
funding markets. That the government had to take such extreme action, however, suggested the need for reform. 134
Paul G. Mahoney, Deregulation and the Subprime Crisis, 104 VA. L. REV. 235, 239 (2018).
Mahoney, supra note 128, at 289.
130
See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (1984). NAV represents the value of the assets in a fund’s portfolio
divided by the number of outstanding shares or units.
131
Mahoney, supra note 128, at 236.
132
Fact Sheet: Reforming Money Market Funds, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 5, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/opa/Article/press-release-2013-101---related-materials.html [https://perma.cc/
R96S-QZSS].
133
For instance, the Fed has no formal authority to insure debt, yet it effectively did just that with
the creation of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility
(AMLF) in September 2008. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., ASSET-BACKED
COMMERCIAL PAPER MONEY MARKET MUTUAL FUND LIQUIDITY FACILITY, https://www.federal
reserve.gov/monetarypolicy/abcpmmmf.htm [https://perma.cc/QZ4Y-4LZ9]. To implement this program, the Fed invoked its emergency lending authority under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve
Act, despite this provision containing no basis for the Fed to provide guarantees for financial instruments. See 12 U.S.C. § 343(3) (2020); see also Kathryn Judge, Guarantor of Last Resort, 97 TEX. L.
REV. 707, 727–34 (2019) (describing how various government institutions, including the Fed and the
Treasury Department “had to stretch their formal authority to achieve a desired aim”).
134
William C. Dudley, Opinion, For Stability’s Sake, Reform Money Funds, BLOOMBERG OPINION
(Aug. 14, 2012), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2012-08-14/for-stability-s-sake-reform128
129

2324

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 61:1

The Dodd-Frank Act did not address money market funds, as the SEC already had sufficient authority to address the challenges revealed during the
crisis. When the SEC failed to take meaningful action, the FSOC took the unusual step of seeking public comment on ways to reform money market
funds. 135 This move was designed to, and had the effect of, prompting the SEC
to pursue more substantive reforms.
In June 2013, nearly five years after the 2008 run on money market
funds—and after policymakers had expended significant resources assessing
how best to proceed—the SEC issued a proposed notice of rulemaking. The
proposal was 693 pages and included 1,248 footnotes. 136 Its focus was on how
to reform the prime money market funds held by large institutional investors. 137 The SEC received 1,400 comment letters and engaged in numerous
meetings with industry and other stakeholders over the following year. Although 1,200 of those letters were form letters, the remainder were individualized, and often exceptionally detailed. 138 They included letters from industry
participants, trade groups, and law firms, as well as nonfinancial firms, academics, and others. Public records reveal 108 separate meetings or phone calls
between SEC commissioners or staff, on the one hand, and stakeholders, including SIFMA, Goldman Sachs, Vanguard, Blackrock, the AFL-CIO, Better
Markets, and UPS, on the other. 139 In short, substantial effort was invested in
this process.
The SEC issued its final rule just over a year later. The final rule, together
with supporting material, was 893 pages long and included 2,530 footnotes. 140
It was detailed and, in some regards, exceptionally thorough. In the process of
explaining its reasons for the final rule, the SEC addressed the myriad and ofmoney-funds [https://perma.cc/QUY7-K3X5]; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Why Investors Should Worry About
Money Funds, WALL STREET J. (June 3, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230
4520804576343093940388186 [https://perma.cc/D3PF-9N8A].
135
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Financial Stability Oversight Council Releases Proposed Recommendations for Money Market Mutual Fund Reform (Nov. 13, 2012), https://www.
treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1764.aspx [https://perma.cc/FD29-XP83].
136
Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF (proposed June 5, 2013), https://www.
sec.gov/rules/proposed/2013/33-9408.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LWC-D9MA] (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 210, 230, 239, 270, 274, 279).
137
Id.
138
Comments on Proposed Rule: Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, Release No. 33-9408, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/s70313.shtml [https://perma.cc/9QZD6GJM] (last updated July 23, 2014).
139
Id.
140
The SEC describes the rule on their website. Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to
Form PF, Corrected to Conform to Federal Register, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2014/33-9616.
pdf [https://perma.cc/P7XV-SGZ9]. The official version published in the Federal Register is far denser, and hence comes in at a mere 250 pages. Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF,
79 Fed. Reg. 47,736–47,982 (Aug. 14, 2014) (codified at scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.).
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ten conflicting views that had been expressed in the comment letters received
regarding the probable effects of the reforms. 141
In the Final Release, the culmination of years of effort and analysis, the
SEC stated its belief that the reforms would reduce money market funds’ susceptibility to heavy redemptions, improve their ability to manage contagion,
and increase the transparency of their risks, while preserving, as much as possible, their benefits. 142 The SEC then went on to explain why. “Market discipline” received significant attention, including 17 separate mentions. 143 The
SEC agreed with many commenters “that daily disclosure [that is, a floating
NAV] will increase market discipline, which could ultimately deter situations
that could lead to heavy redemptions.” 144 The hope was that if money market
funds provide more detailed information about the value of their assets, and
that even small value changes affect the price investors receive when redeeming their shares, those investors would pressure mutual fund managers to be
more conservative in their holdings, reducing the risk and the likelihood of
future runs.
The SEC and numerous letter writers also acknowledged the possibility of
broader, systemic ramifications. One big question was whether institutional
investors would continue to hold prime money market funds once the changes,
like floating NAVs, were implemented. The SEC identified more than a dozen
alternative instruments that institutional investors might choose instead of
money market funds. It ultimately concluded that “some outflow” was likely
but that it was “not able to estimate” how much. The SEC said that “[g]iven
the heterogeneity of investors’ preferences and investment objectives and constraints,” there was no expectation that investors would relocate their assets in
the same alternative instrument. 145 In short, they expected that the changes
would cause some investors to seek out substitutes, but they could not hazard a
guess as to how many, and they thought that different investors would seek
different alternatives. They reached an even more equivocal non-conclusion
regarding the macroeconomic effects of the reforms. 146
In hindsight, it is notable that the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks)
were mentioned only once in the entire Release. 147 Specifically, the FHLBanks
were mentioned in a footnote identifying the various types of securities in
79 Fed. Reg. at 47,736–47,982.
Id. at 47,739.
143
Id. at 47,736–47,982.
144
Id. at 47,828.
145
Id. at 47,911.
146
Id. at 47,910 (“[W]e acknowledge changes in the market arising from the reforms may have
macroeconomic effects in the future” but “[b]ecause we cannot foresee all of the ways markets will
evolve, we cannot predict [those] . . . effects.”).
147
See id. at 47,904 n.1893.
141
142
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which government money market funds—not “prime” funds—are permitted to
invest.” 148 The FHLBanks, like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are governmentsponsored enterprises created after the Depression to facilitate home ownership. Today, the primary way that the FHLBanks purport to do this is by making loans to member banks and insurance companies collateralized by mortgage-related assets. The FHLBanks fund these loans by issuing debt through
the FHLBank Office of Finance, for which all of the FHLBanks are jointly
liable. The federal government does not explicitly guarantee the debt they issue, but it is widely believed that the government would step in to protect that
debt if needed. 149 Because investors had run into—rather than out of—
government money market funds in 2008, the SEC had not seen any reason to
revise the rules governing those funds, which could still use the $1.00 fixed
NAV. This was the product of years of dialogue and input from government
bodies, industry, think tanks, and academics. This was the process that was
meant to improve the quality of the final rule and ensure its legitimacy by allowing robust and public discussion of the issues at stake.
The new rules became effective two years after being finalized, in October 2016. 150 The response of investors was immediate and unequivocal. At the
beginning of 2014, before the reforms were finalized, there was nearly $950
billion invested in the prime money market fund affected by the reforms. 151 By
the time the rule was fully implemented that number had plummeted to just
over $120 billion. 152 It turns out that the features the SEC identified as making
money market funds vulnerable were ones that most investors were not willing
to forego. Rather than turning to a diverse array of alternatives as the SEC had
predicted, however, investors moved virtually all of those funds into the exact
same alternative: government money market funds not subject to the new
148

Id.
See generally Kathryn Judge, Three Discount Windows, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 795 (2014) (explaining the history of the FHLBanks, what they do, and how they have evolved).
150
Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. at 47,736.
151
Derived from data provided by the Investment Company Institute (Apr. 16, 2019) (on file with
authors). A number of other sources understate the full effect of the rule by relying on SEC data that
breaks money market funds into three categories: prime, government and tax-exempt. U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, MONEY MARKET FUND STATISTICS (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/
investment/mmf-statistics/mmf-statistics-2017-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/CHN3-NTVN]; Catherine
Chen et al., Money Market Funds and the New SEC Regulation, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. LIBERTY ST.
ECON. (Mar. 20, 2017), https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2017/03/money-market-fundsand-the-new-sec-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/P7TY-LY7T]; Nellie Liang, Why Congress
Shouldn’t Roll Back the SEC’s Money Market Rules, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.
brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/01/12/why-congress-shouldnt-roll-back-the-secs-money-marketrules/ [https://perma.cc/P23M-2VHD]. The challenge is that prime funds held by retail investors were
not affected by the reforms, hence there was little change in the value of such funds outstanding. The
more granular data from the ICI makes this plain. Data, Investment Company Institute, supra.
152
Data, Investment Company Institute, supra note 151.
149
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rules. 153 The total assets invested in money market funds thus remained fairly
constant; it was the allocation of these assets among those funds that changed
dramatically.
The spike in flows into government money market funds was made possible by a dramatic increase in the issuance of short-term debt instruments by
the FHLBanks. Between the end of 2015 and the end of 2017, the value of
short-term floating notes issued by the FHLBank system increased from $80
billion, or 8.9% of total bonds and notes outstanding, to $297 billion, or
29.2%. 154 In other words, the FHLBanks more than tripled their reliance on the
type of short-term debt most useful to money market funds. 155 Because most of
the loans they issue are of a longer duration, the reliance exposed FHLBanks
to a greater maturity mismatch on their balance sheets. The size of their balance sheets also grew. 156 This was in part a response to the increased demand
for FHLBank debt arising out of spurred reforms, but also to new liquidity requirements imposed on banks that increased their demand for longer term
funding of the kind the FHLBanks can provide. 157 There was thus an interaction between, on the one hand, the SEC’s reforms, and on the other, the new
rules promulgated by the Basel Committee and implemented by the Fed, that
collectively brought about changes on both sides of the balance sheet of the
FHLBank system. Needless to say, the FHLBanks are overseen by the Federal
Housing Finance Authority, thus falling outside the jurisdiction of both the
SEC and the bank regulators responsible for implementing the new liquidity
rules.
Putting these pieces together, the net effect of the SEC’s reforms has thus
far been to position the FHLBanks between banks and money market funds.
Instead of raising capital by issuing short-term debt that was then held by
money market funds, banks today borrow more from FHLBanks, which then
loan the money onto banks. Thus, rather than increasing market discipline, the
reforms seem to have reduced it. Additionally, the reforms have contributed to
a FHLBank system that is both larger and—owing to the greater maturity
153
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 33 fig.4-4
(Nov. 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-201811.pdf
[https://perma.cc/89E2-TCN9]; Liang, supra note 151.
154
CLAUDE LOPEZ ET AL., MILKEN INST., MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: WHERE DO WE STAND? 17 (Mar. 2018), https://assets1c.milkeninstitute.org/assets/Publication/
ResearchReport/PDF/MI-Macroprud-Policy-WEB-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR34-2C52].
155
Id.
156
Id. at 18.
157
Banks’ increased demand for FHLBank advances came, in part, from large banks now having
to comply with new liquidity requirements. The two outcomes are codetermined, however, in the
sense that the increased demand for FHLBank liabilities reduces their funding costs, enabling them to
provide advances to banks on more attractive terms. See id. at 17.
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mismatch—more fragile. Institutional investors now generally hold government money market funds instead of prime funds, but otherwise hold effectively the same product as they did before the reforms. 158
The effects of the SEC’s reforms are thus mixed. Money market funds
probably are more stable. Yet this has happened in significant part by increasing the government footprint. Government guarantees, even if implicit, often
help enhance stability. But they can also undermine market discipline and increase the likelihood of taxpayer losses. The increased size and fragility of the
FHLBanks also raise a host of questions about their oversight and operations. 159
Our aim here is not to resolve these policy questions, but to point out that
these are among the most important—and contestable—questions raised by the
actual effect of the SEC’s reforms. Nonetheless, they were not among the numerous issues debated by policymakers, industry participants, and other stakeholders before the reforms were adopted. Despite the years of study and debate, the possibility that the FHLBank system would grow, evolve, and assume
additional risks to satisfy new demand for government money market funds
was not even mentioned in the nearly 900 pages and more than 2,500 footnotes
of the Final Release.
It would be easy to fault the SEC for this, but the SEC was not alone in its
failure. 160 One aim of the lengthy, resource-intensive process that the SEC undertook before adopting the reforms was to glean insights from market participants, academics, and other stakeholders. The materials these stakeholders
provided were voluminous and detailed, and yet they too seem to have missed
the mark. The lack of discussion of these ultimately pivotal issues is thus a
failure of the processes meant to inform the SEC, not one specific to the institutional competence of the SEC itself.
158
The magnitude of the decline has been moderated both by the fact that most have shifted into
government funds that are relatively riskier (those holding agency debt like that issued by the FHLBanks
rather than just Treasuries), and by the way the FHLBanks’ increased issuance of short-term instruments
may have helped mute a decline in the return on eligible instruments as a result of the increased demand.
Stefan Gissler & Borghan Narajabad, The Increased Role of the Federal Home Loan Bank System in Funding Markets, Part 2: Recent Trends and Potential Drivers, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS.:
FEDS NOTES (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/the-increasedrole-of-the-federal-home-loan-bank-system-in-funding-markets-part-2-20171018.htm [https://perma.c
c/8EJK-EUDE].
159
See Stanley Fischer, Vice Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., An Assessment of Financial Stability in the United States, Remarks at the IMF Workshop on Financial Surveillance and Communication (June 27, 2017), https://www.bis.org/review/r170704b.pdf [https://perma.
cc/WH5Y-UZDV].
160
In particular, the SEC seems to have viewed the situation as a market regulator without an adequate appreciation of why and how much some investors value “money-like” claims. See Judge,
Investor-Driven Innovation, supra note 48, at 307–12.
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Also noteworthy is the fact that, now that we have high-quality, accurate
information about the impact of these reforms, the window for discussion is
largely closed. Some policymakers, researchers, and think tanks have drawn
attention to these dynamics, but there is little concerted discussion of whether
the changes wrought by the SEC’s reforms are desirable—let alone whether
they demand a further regulatory response. The frictions that would impede
any change to the new rules, along with exhaustion from the effort already expended, are likely among the factors contributing to this inertia.
Before leaving this case study, it is worth emphasizing the relevance of
the events leading up to the crisis to our analysis. Money market funds were a
core component of the shadow banking system and enabled that system to use
short-term money-like liabilities to fund longer term illiquid assets like home
loans. They did not grow in the “shadows” in the sense of being out of sight.
Their growth was widely observed, discussed, and facilitated by SEC regulations. 161 They were in the shadows only in the limited, albeit very important,
sense of being outside the perimeter of the prudential regulatory regime governing banks and other institutions known to pose systemic risks. This was
both because of, and a contributing factor to, the failure of policymakers to
appreciate their systemic significance.
B. The Basel Capital and Liquidity Requirements
Shifting from shadow banks to banks provides further insight into how
dynamism, complexity, and unknowns contribute to a fundamental mismatch
between finance and financial regulation. Capital requirements—rules governing how banks finance their activities—have long been a cornerstone of bank
regulation. The basic function of these requirements is simple. Because equity
can absorb losses, utilizing more equity makes banks better able to withstand
declining asset prices, thus reducing both the probability and potential impact
of bank failure. Thicker capital cushions may also help to assure depositors
and other short-term creditors of a bank’s health, thereby reducing the probability of a run. 162
In practice, however, there are several reasons why shareholders and
managers may prefer debt over equity. 163 First, issuing short-term debt-like
deposits is not just how banks fund themselves, it is their product—it is what
See Mahoney, supra note 128, at 238.
Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and
Bank Regulation, in FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 109, 111 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed.,
1991).
163
See generally ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S
WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (rev. ed. 2013) (comprehensively analyzing
why bank shareholders and managers may prefer debt to equity).
161
162
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they are designed to do. 164 Second, debt often enjoys certain tax advantages. 165
Third, shareholders may seek to use debt—and short-term debt in particular—
as a commitment mechanism to help address potential agency problems vis-àvis bank managers. 166 Fourth, bank managers may prefer debt because it mechanically increases a bank’s return on equity, a common metric for performance-based compensation. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, explicit
and implicit government backing for the debt that banks issue lowers the cost
of debt relative to equity. 167 Viewed from this perspective, minimum capital
requirements serve as a counterweight to the incentives of shareholders, managers, and creditors to operate with dangerously low levels of loss-absorbing
capital. They also mitigate the moral hazard generated by the expectation of
government support and help address the fact that the government can never
credibly commit to not support banks given the massive costs that banking
panics can impose on the real economy.
The Basel Committee published the first international capital standards in
1988. The U.S. government then incorporated the standards into federal law,
phasing them in between 1989 and 1992. 168 Even before the ink was dry, observers were pointing out flaws in the Basel framework. 169 In particular, Basel
I adopted a crude approach to risk-weighting bank assets for the purposes of
calculating minimum capital requirements, one that essentially divided the entire universe of financial assets into four categories—or “buckets”—based on
their perceived riskiness. This presented banks with a relatively straightforward arbitrage opportunity. Specifically, by investing in the riskiest assets in
any given bucket, banks could take more risks, and presumably generate more
profits, while being required to hold the exact same amount of capital.
Introduced in 2004, Basel II sought to eliminate this arbitrage opportunity
by permitting larger and more sophisticated banks to calculate their own risk
164

(2014).

Gary Gorton, The Development of Opacity in U.S. Banking, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 825, 827

165
See generally Mark J. Roe & Michael Tröge, Containing Systemic Risk by Taxing Banks
Properly, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 181 (2018) (noting that “current tax rules work against financial stability by penalizing equity and favoring debt”). These tax advantages include the deductibility of interest
payments paid on debt securities. Id.
166
See Charles W. Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring
Optimal Banking Arrangements, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 497, 498–99 (1991).
167
Maureen O’Hara & Wayne Shaw, Deposit Insurance and Wealth Effects: The Value of Being
“Too Big to Fail,” 45 J. FIN. 1587, 1587–88 (1990); see also Viral V. Acharya, Deniz Anginer & A.
Joseph Warburton, The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit Government
Guarantees 2 (May 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1961656 [https://
perma.cc/4M58-5BLU].
168
See Capital; Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 4,186 (Jan. 27, 1989) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pts. 208, 225); Capital Maintenance; Final Statement of Policy on Risk-Based Capital, 54
Fed. Reg. 11,500 (Mar. 21, 1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 325).
169
See GOODHART, supra note 85, at 576.
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weights under the “internal ratings-based” (or IRB) approach. In a nutshell, the
IRB approach enabled banks to use their own internal computer models, historical default rates, and other market data to generate the key input variables
necessary to calculate minimum capital requirements for both their loan and
trading books. 170 In addition to eliminating the arbitrage opportunities presented by Basel I, the introduction of the IRB approach appears to have been motivated by a desire on the part of bank regulators to ensure that capital requirements were as “accurate” as possible, i.e., that they reflected institutional and
market-based assessments of credit, market, and other risks. 171
The Basel II implementation coincided with the outbreak of the 2007–
2009 crisis, which in turn exposed the flaws in the IRB approach. As a preliminary matter, the crisis demonstrated that financial models based on historical
data are vulnerable to small sample errors and the under-estimation of socalled “tail” risks. 172 The wide variance in risk-weighting methodologies also
stoked concerns that banks were using their discretion over important input
variables to reduce their capital requirements. 173 And most importantly, the
crisis demonstrated that market-based measures of credit, market, and other
risks cannot capture the systemic risks arising from the various complex,
opaque, and interconnected activities undertaken by banks and other financial
institutions. 174 Banks’ risk-management systems and the regulatory schemes
relying on them failed, in part because the world was complicated and dynamic
in ways their models could not capture.
Predictably, the crisis was followed by yet another overhaul of the Basel
framework. First published in 2010—and revised in 2011, 2012, 2014, 2016

170
The IRB approach is itself divided into two subcategories: foundational and advanced IRB. In
connection with a bank’s loan book, for example, the foundational approach would permit the bank to
calculate a loan’s probability of default (PD). Under the advanced approach, meanwhile, the bank
would be permitted to calculate PD, loss given default (LGD), and exposure at default (EAD).
171
See GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 38, at 36.
172
JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 302 (2016); see Ranjit Lall,
Why Basel II Failed and Why Any Basel III Is Doomed 17 (Univ. of Oxford, Glob. Econ. Governance
Programme (GEG), Working Paper, No. 2009/52, 2009), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/
196313/1/GEG-WP-052.pdf [https://perma.cc/C89A-TTMY] (describing this limitation of VaR models and citing their failure to anticipate the widespread losses related to Russia’s 1998 default as another example of this model failure).
173
See BCBS, REGULATORY CONSISTENCY ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME (RCAP)—ANALYSIS OF
RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS FOR MARKET RISK (Jan. 31, 2013), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs240.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7QY6-Q2AS] (providing empirical evidence of this variance); Vanessa Le Leslé &
Sofiya Avramova, Revisiting Risk-Weighted Assets: “Why Do RWAs Differ Across Countries and
What Can Be Done About It?” (IMF Working Paper, WP 12/90, 2012), https://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp1290.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q46J-4DB5] (same).
174
See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 172, at 301.
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and 2017—Basel III introduces a number of significant reforms. 175 In the
realm of bank capital, these reforms include refinements to the definition and
categories of capital, new countercyclical capital and capital conservation
buffers, and a capital surcharge for global systemically important banks.176 The
Basel Committee has also responded to the threat that banks might manipulate
the IRB approach by introducing a non-risk-weighted leverage ratio and, more
recently, risk-weight floors for credit, market, and operational risks. 177 The
target date for full implementation of Basel III was originally January 1,
2019—almost a full decade after these new standards were first published.178
Many of the more recent reforms, including the new risk-weight floors, are not
scheduled for full implementation until 2027. 179
The first thing that the thirty-year arc between Basel I and III makes clear
is the pervasive and unpredictable impact of regulatory arbitrage. Despite the
time, effort, and other resources committed to designing and refining the Basel
framework, each iteration has been undercut by banks’ efforts to limit its impact and effectiveness. Much of the evolution of the Basel framework could be
cast as a process of policymakers’ ongoing—and often unsuccessful—attempts
to curb regulatory arbitrage. Given the time lag between the publication of new
Basel standards and their implementation into domestic law, banks will likely
find new ways of arbitraging Basel III long before these reforms come into full
force and effect. 180 On our present course, it is therefore only a matter of time
before we see another round of fundamental capital reforms. There are very
good reasons to regulate bank capital, and having better capitalized banks
should enhance systemic stability. Additionally, reforms like the simple leverage ratio are meant to address the dynamism and unknowns identified here to
be a core challenge for financial regulation. Nonetheless, the specific processes
that the Basel Committee has employed to try to improve capital regulation
have consistently generated unintended consequences, while often leaving
banks undercapitalized when it matters most.
Crucially, regulatory arbitrage of the Basel framework has been an important driver of both dynamism and complexity. The development of structured finance provides an illustrative example. Among the many reasons for
175
See BCBS, BASEL III GLOBAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 87 (containing a history of the revisions to this framework); BCBS, FINALISING POST-CRISIS REFORMS, supra note 87.
176
See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 172, at ch. 13 (summarizing these reforms).
177
See BCBS, FINALISING POST-CRISIS REFORMS, supra note 87, at 137–58.
178
See BCBS, BASEL III GLOBAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 87, at 69 annex 4.
179
BCBS, FINALISING POST-CRISIS REFORMS, supra note 87, at 8, 139.
180
See, e.g., Dong Beom Choi, Michael R. Holcomb & Donald P. Morgan, Bank Leverage Limits
and Regulatory Arbitrage: Old Question, New Evidence (Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No.
856, 2018, rev. 2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr856.
pdf [https://perma.cc/THM9-U964].
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the rise of structured finance during the 1990s was the fact that selling mortgages and other loans into bankruptcy-remote entities provided sponsoring
banks with relief from capital requirements. 181 The forces of regulatory arbitrage thus contributed to the emergence and development of a complex financial ecosystem within which risks were often highly fragmented, but where—
sometimes unbeknownst to regulators—contingent obligations buried deep
within the documentation exposed sponsoring banks to the risk of widespread
market disruption. 182 Perversely, then, the very rules designed to ensure the
stability of banks helped spur the creation of new markets, institutions, and
instruments that made it more difficult for regulators to detect the build-up of
potential systemic risks within the banking system.
How policymakers have responded to the threat of regulatory arbitrage
has also contributed to the complexity of banking regulation. Historically, the
Basel Committee has responded to this threat by writing detailed rules designed to close the gaps exploited by banks for the purposes of reducing their
capital requirements. 183 The resulting rulification is reflected in the ever increasing length of the Basel framework: while Basel I was articulated in a crisp
30 pages, Basel II ran to 347 pages, and Basel III came out at a staggering 616
pages. 184 In the United States, the legislation and regulations implementing
Basel III came out at over 1,000 pages. 185 The problem is that adopting new,
more detailed, and more complex rules invites banks to find new, more bespoke, and more complex ways of getting around them. 186 It is therefore unsurprising that attempts to combat regulatory arbitrage with yet more detailed
regulation have led to an exponential increase in the size and complexity of the
Basel rulebook without necessarily yielding any commensurate increase in its
effectiveness. As Andy Haldane and Vasileios Madouros have observed: “the
regulatory response to the crisis has largely been based on the level of thinking

181
See David Jones, Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and Related Issues, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 35, 51–52 (2000).
182
See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 172, at 465–66.
183
See GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 38, at 3.
184
See Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability & Member, Fin. Policy Comm. & Vasileios
Madouros, Economist, Bank of Eng., The Dog and the Frisbee (Aug. 31, 2012), https://www.bankof
england.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/paper/2012/the-dog-and-the-frisbee.pdf?la=en&hash=4DEAA2E6D
1698A1A0891153A6B4CE70F308351D7 [https://perma.cc/5D7Z-U2C3] (providing empirical data
describing this rulification, along with an overview of the challenges it creates for both policymakers
and market participants).
185
Id. at 10.
186
See Charles Goodhart, Problems of Monetary Management: The UK Experience, in MONETARY THEORY AND PRACTICE: THE UK EXPERIENCE 91, 96 (1984) (encapsulating this observation by
predicting “that any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it
for control purposes”).
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that created it.” 187 Thus, “[t]he Tower of Basel, like its near-namesake the
Tower of Babel, continues to rise.” 188
The rulification of the Basel framework has also increased the probability
that rules will interact in unexpected and potentially harmful ways. 189 Economists Robin Greenwood and coauthors, for example, have demonstrated how
the combination of market-based risk-weighting methodologies (introduced
under Basel II) with a non-risk-weighted leverage ratio (introduced under Basel III) can incentivize banks to shift into lines of business where they are less
competitive and, conversely, lead them to eschew lines of business where they
possess a comparative advantage. 190 Greenwood and his coauthors see two
reasons to be worried about these findings. First, the interaction between these
different regulatory requirements may spur banks to enter businesses where
they have little historical expertise, existing capabilities, or risk-management
infrastructure. 191 Second, insofar as these requirements drive banks to adopt
similar business models, this could increase the risk of correlated undercapitalization during periods of market turmoil. 192 In this way, the incremental buildup of well-intentioned rules can both engender significant changes within the
financial system and potentially sow the seeds of future instability.
Lastly, the Basel framework has contributed to the cyclicality of finance.
Perhaps the best example is the introduction of a risk-weighting methodology
under Basel II. 193 As described above, Basel II tied the amount of capital that
banks must hold to the riskiness of the assets in their portfolios. Under the IRB
approach, banks could then calculate the riskiness of these assets using their
own data on historical default rates and market volatility. During periods of
economic expansion, the relatively low level of defaults and muted volatility
would translate into lower capital requirements—enabling banks to extend
Haldane & Madouros, supra note 184, at 18.
Id.
189
See GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 38. As described below, the Financial Stability Board
(FSB) has recently highlighted how the Basel III leverage ratio interacts with the new margin requirements for derivatives to disincentivize access to central clearing, thus undermining one of the key
pillars of the post-Crisis reform agenda. See FSB, INCENTIVES TO CENTRALLY CLEAR OVER THE
COUNTER (OTC) DERIVATIVES: A POST-IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE
G20 REGULATORY REFORMS—FINAL REPORT 4, 62–68 (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/R191118-1-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXJ5-8PZD] [hereinafter FSB, INCENTIVES TO
CENTRALLY CLEAR OTC DERIVATIVES]; see also Richard Haynes, Lihong McPhail & Haoxiang Zhu,
When Leverage Ratio Meets Derivatives: Running Out of Options? CFTC RESEARCH PAPER (Oct. 29,
2018), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-05/oce_leverage_and_options_ada.pdf [https://
perma.cc/D36F-XEFB].
190
GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 38, at 18–19.
191
Id. at 27.
192
Id.
193
Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, Cyclical Implications of the Basel II Capital Standards,
ECON. PERSPECTIVES, 1Q/2004, at 18.
187
188
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more credit on the basis of the same level of capital. In this way, capital requirements would reinforce economic booms and, potentially, contribute to the
formation of asset and credit bubbles. When these bubbles burst, riskweighted capital requirements would also reinforce the resulting economic
contraction, thus forcing banks to raise more capital during periods of relatively high volatility, reduce lending, or sell portfolio assets to shore up their balance sheets.
Many of these same challenges can also be observed in connection with
new liquidity rules introduced under Basel III. Many view the acute liquidity
problems that banks and other financial institutions experienced as the root of
the crisis. 194 In response, the Basel Committee introduced two new liquidity
rules: the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and net stable funding ratio
(NSFR). 195 The LCR is designed to ensure that banks have a sufficient stock of
high-quality liquid assets to survive a hypothetical thirty-day stress scenario.196
The NSFR, meanwhile, is designed to constrain the reliance of banks on unstable, short-term sources of wholesale funding. 197
While the rationale for both the LCR and NSFR may seem relatively
straightforward, their design and implementation have proven to be challenging. The OFR, for example, has suggested that the complexity of the LCR, at
least as adopted in the United States, serves to undermine its utility as a
benchmark for evaluating a bank’s liquidity position. 198 There is also some
evidence, and much concern, that the LCR may be reducing the amount of liquidity creation and transformation being performed by banks and other financial institutions. 199 And as noted above, the LCR is among the forces interacting with recent money market mutual fund reforms to spur the growth of the
194
See Marco Macchiavelli & Luke Pettit, Liquidity Regulation and Financial Intermediaries 1
(Working Paper, Dec. 19, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3179800 [https://
perma.cc/76WR-AMPF].
195
BCBS, BASEL III: THE LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQUIDITY RISK MONITORING
TOOLS (Jan. 2013), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf [https://perma.cc/D434-BGWS]; BCBS,
BASEL III: THE NET STABLE FUNDING RATIO (Oct. 2014), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J4W7-7WTK].
196
Jill Cetina & Katherine Gleason, The Difficult Business of Measuring Banks’ Liquidity: Understanding the Liquidity Coverage Ratio 1 (Office of Fin. Research Working Paper 15-20, 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2681372 [https://perma.cc/497Y-4Y68].
197
Michael R. King, The Basel III Net Stable Funding Ratio and Bank Net Interest Margins, 37 J.
BANKING & FIN. 4144, 4145 (2013).
198
Cetina & Gleason, supra note 196, at 2.
199
Petro Gete & Michael Reher, Mortgage Securitization and Shadow Bank Lending 2 (June
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2921691 [https://perma.cc/DA83-GL9P];
Macchiavelli & Pettit, supra note 194, at 5; Daniel Roberts et al., Bank Liquidity Creation, Systemic
Risk, and Basel Liquidity Regulations 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No. 852, 2018),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr852.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HP3H-JCFR].
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FHLBank system. 200 It is also changing the types of banks that are borrowing
from FHLBanks, leading to more borrowing by the largest banks, and thus potentially engendering competition among them. 201 Meanwhile, full implementation has been delayed in part based on concerns about potential unintended
consequences, along with its possible impact on bank profitability. 202 Thus,
despite the best of intentions, it is still far from clear whether the new Basel
liquidity rules will ultimately have the desired impact.
Just how little we know about the potential impact of the new Basel liquidity rules is evident from the debate surrounding the causes of recent instability in the U.S. “repo” market. For several days in September 2019, interest
rates within short-term “repo” markets experienced a short, sharp spike—from
roughly 2% to a high of 10%. 203 This spike coincided with both the end of the
corporate tax year and a significant new issuance of U.S. government debt,
both foreseeable events that the Fed should have been able to manage. Observers have advanced a number of different explanations for this spike. One explanation is that new capital and liquidity rules may have made banks more
hesitant to engage in the arbitrage that should have normally moderated this
type of instability. 204 Others have blamed the Fed’s policy of paying banks’
interest on excess reserves. 205 Whatever the explanation, this instability ultimately ended with the Fed injecting over one hundred billion dollars into the
market. We do not have any deep insight into the actual causes, but the Fed’s
inability to predict and avoid a spike of this magnitude and the degree of contestation over the reasons for it are themselves indications of just how complex
and costly the current regime is, both in terms of outcomes and accountability.
The dynamism and complexity of modern finance, together with the poorly understood feedback effects between capital requirements and bank behavior, generate significant unknowns. Indeed, for all the technocratic expertise
that has gone into the design of the Basel framework—including several atSee supra notes 125–161 and accompanying text.
Gissler & Narajabad, supra note 158.
202
King, supra note 197, at 4145.
203
Joe Rennison & Laura Noonan, Week of Repo Turmoil Puts Wall Street Traders in a Spin, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/fa14c286-db59-11e9-8f9b-77216ebe1f17 [https://
perma.cc/6PZA-CFYH].
204
See, e.g., Erik Sherman, The Fed’s Repo Market Bailout Is a Sign of Deeper Problems—That
Are Getting Worse Over Time, FORTUNE (Sept. 26, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/09/26/the-fedsrepo-market-bailout-is-a-sign-of-deeper-problems-that-are-getting-worse-over-time/ [https://perma.
cc/EFE6-PVCV] (explaining how the LCR in particular may have prevented banks from providing
liquidity to the marketplace).
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by reducing the amount of interest it pays on excess reserves. See Jeff Cox, Fed Cuts Rate on Bank
Reserves Amid Repo Market Turmoil, CNBC (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/18/fedioer-fed-cuts-rate-on-bank-reserves-amid-repo-turmoil.html [https://perma.cc/U7W5-9CQ5].
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tempts to empirically quantify its costs and benefits—there is still remarkably
little agreement around many seemingly basic questions. Perhaps most importantly, while something of a consensus has started to emerge around the
need for stringent capital requirements, there is considerably less agreement
around the precise benefits and costs of imposing higher capital requirements
on banks and other large financial institutions, the tradeoffs of having multiple
different constraints, and the value of having liquidity constraints alongside the
capital requirements. 206
The ongoing evolution of the Basel capital requirements demonstrates,
yet again, just how much faster finance moves relative to financial regulation.
More importantly, it demonstrates how conventional approaches to financial
regulation are poorly equipped to address the challenges stemming from the
dynamism, complexity and unknowns of the financial system. Although capital
can help protect against unknowns and uncertainty, layered capital requirements can exacerbate those very dynamics. Examining the history of capital
requirements—how they have evolved and how banks have responded to
them—reveals significant failings in the processes through which these requirements are promulgated, enforced, and revised.
C. Broadening the Lens
Taking a step back from our two case studies reveals that this mismatch
between finance and financial regulation is not an isolated phenomenon. In
fact, we could have just as easily picked any number of post-crisis reforms.
The details inevitably vary, but these reforms have almost universally generated effects—some positive, others less so—that, despite the breadth and depth
of the policy process leading up to their adoption, were unforeseen. Take, for
example, mandatory central clearing of derivatives. To facilitate netting and
promote transparency, the United States and other countries now require standardized derivatives to be cleared through centralized clearinghouses. 207 To be
sure, mandatory clearing may have yielded many of the expected gains, but it
has simultaneously increased the size and systemic importance of clearinghouses, thus effectively creating new nodes of systemic risk.208 It has also contributed to the massive growth and concentration of the largest clearinghouses
and reduced market discipline among clearing members, who now have less

206
See Eric A. Posner, How Do Bank Regulators Determine Capital-Adequacy Requirements?,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1853, 1862–64 (2015) (surveying different views on this question).
207
FSB, INCENTIVES TO CENTRALLY CLEAR OTC DERIVATIVES, supra note 189, at 1.
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See id. at 90–91.
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direct exposure to the default of other clearing members. 209 These and other
developments raise real questions about the authority and role of regulators
should something go wrong. 210
Another example is the controversial Volcker Rule, a provision of the
Dodd-Frank Act that prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading.211
From the outset, commentators questioned whether activities that were not obviously tied to the causes of the crisis should be targeted for reform. 212 The
rule took years to finalize, is massively complex, and imposes significant compliance costs on banks. Indeed, Volcker himself has lamented its complexity.213
Initially viewed by its sponsors as a modern-day version of the (initially far
simpler) separation of commercial and investment banking under the GlassSteagall Act, the rule ultimately morphed into something nobody in Congress
had envisioned. 214 There have also been fears, and mixed evidence, that the
rule may be adversely affecting liquidity in the bond market. 215 At the same
time, others now see benefits of the rule that they did not anticipate in advance.
For example, the rule may have a greater capacity to change who wants to
work at a bank and to alter the overall risk-taking culture of banks than initial-

209
See Amir Khwaja, Swaps Data: The Monopoly Effect in Clearing, RISK.NET (Feb. 15, 2018),
https://www.risk.net/comment/5416976/swaps-data-the-monopoly-effect-in-clearing [https://perma.
cc/DV8X-NJF6] (providing a detailed breakdown of market share for an array of products in the
swaps markets and showing massive concentration for many products).
210
OFR FIN. RESEARCH ADVISORY COMM., CCP RESOLUTION WORKING GRP.: MANAGING THE
RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION OF A CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY 3 (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.
financialresearch.gov/frac/files/OFR_FRAC-meeting_working-group_ccp_02-28-2019.pdf [https://
perma.cc/S5F6-BL3D].
211
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619,
124 Stat. 1376, 1620 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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cc/DHE7-QL7N].
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https://www.reuters.com/article/us-regulation-volcker/paul-volcker-says-volcker-rule-too-complicatedidUSTRE7A83KN20111109 [https://web.archive.org/web/20200825013502/https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-regulation-volcker/paul-volcker-says-volcker-rule-too-complicated-idUSTRE7A83KN20
111109] (quoting Paul Volcker as saying that the Volcker Rule is “much more complicated than I
would like to see”).
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See Sen. Jeff Merkley & Sen. Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Proprietary
Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
515, 538–39 (2011) (explaining the origins and evolution of the Volcker Rule and why it is intended
to be a modern-day version of Glass-Steagall).
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Stress 2 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Working Paper No. 2016-102, 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
econresdata/feds/2016/files/2016102pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVU2-TFYQ]; see Onnig H. Dombalagian, The Expressive Synergies of the Volker Rule, 54 B.C. L. REV. 469, 471 (2013).
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ly appreciated. 216 Just as we saw in the case of capital requirements, it often
takes time to understand why a rule is working even when it yields real benefits. Even then, the longer term consequences of reform remain difficult to assess.
Going back to the original Glass-Steagall separation between commercial
and investment banks reveals a similar learning curve. According to Senator
Glass, one of the rationales for the separation stemmed from the conflicts of interest arising from allowing commercial banks to underwrite corporate securities. 217 Not until much later did empirical investigation of the quality of preGlass-Steagall securities issued by universal banks cast doubt on this rationale—
helping fuel the case for its repeal. 218 After the recent crisis, however, academics
began looking for better explanations of why the United States’ financial system
had been so stable for the fifty years following the Great Depression. This reexamination produced an array of credible, alternative rationales for why GlassSteagall may have been very helpful in promoting financial stability. Professor
Adam Levitin, for example, has suggested that the “unintended genius of GlassSteagall” was that the structural separation of commercial banks, investment
banks, and insurance companies broke up the political power of the financial
services industry. 219 Glass-Steagall, in other words, created sophisticated, informed, and well-funded industry participants on both sides of many regulatory
debates, forming a more balanced and productive setup for future lawmaking.
Economist Joseph Stiglitz later argued that “[t]he most important consequence of
the repeal of Glass–Steagall was . . . the way repeal changed an entire culture.” 220 In his assessment, the unappreciated benefit of Glass-Steagall was that
it made commercial banks more boring—and thereby more stable—by making
them unattractive places for risk-seeking financiers. 221 Professor Arthur Wilmarth, who has advocated for the return to Glass-Steagall, has similarly suggested that the competitive pressures that push financiers toward greater risk-taking
are exacerbated by the universal banking model. 222
216
John C. Coates, IV, The Volcker Rule as Structural Law: Implications for Cost-Benefit Analysis and Administrative Law, 10 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 447, 453–58 (2015).
217
James R. Smoot, Striking Camp and Moving to Higher Ground: The Hazardous Subtleties of
“Subtle Hazards” in Bank Regulation, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 21, 24 (1995).
218
Randall S. Kroszner & Raghuram G. Rajan, Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A Study of the
U.S. Experience with Universal Banking Before 1933, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 810, 828–29 (1994).
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Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2060–61 (2014).
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The aim here is not to seek answers to these difficult questions or to
weigh in on any particular policy issue. Rather, these examples highlight the
existence of meaningful gaps between the discourse around these rules when
they were first adopted and the effect of these rules once in place. Time and
again, the processes designed to encourage informed debate, enhance the
quality of adopted rules, and promote buy-in from stakeholders have failed to
reveal what has later proved to be among the most critical issues. This is important not only because it means excessive resources are being invested ex
ante, or that potentially counterproductive frictions are imposed on changing
existing rules, but because it means there is in practice often no process allowing for meaningful discussion of the actual issues at stake. Hence those laudatory aims, from efficacy to legitimacy, too often go unfulfilled.
IV. SOME PROGRESS
We are far from the first to observe that dynamism, complexity, and unknowns are core features of modern financial systems. Nor are we the first to
raise concerns about the many challenges they create for financial regulation.
This Part briefly surveys some of the post-crisis reforms and other efforts underway to address these dynamics. 223 It then considers some of the proposals
and models already on the table for addressing these challenges. The focus
here is on why our central claim—that the mismatch between finance and financial regulation helps to explain why financial regulation so often has failed in the
past and will likely fail again in the years ahead—remains pressing despite these
developments. On both fronts, we engage with a thin but hopefully representative slice of the relevant activity and ideas. This analysis suggests that despite
some progress, both analytically and on the ground, the core mismatch remains
and the challenges it imposes are as great, if not greater, than ever.
A. Reforms Underway
1. Harnessing New Technology and Data Standardization
One way to tackle the challenges posed by dynamism, complexity, and
unknowns is for policymakers to take better advantage of technological advancements in the realm of data collection and analysis. These approaches
have the potential to reduce the effective unknowns and make complexity and
dynamism more manageable by enhancing market participants’ and regulators’
abilities to monitor developments and the systemic implications of changes in
a more timely and comprehensive fashion. Closer examination of the post223

See infra notes 223–260 and accompanying text.
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crisis efforts to develop and ensure widespread use of well-designed data
standards supports this promise, but also brings to the fore the pragmatic challenges and current limits of using technology to tackle these challenges.
The good news is that in the wake of the crisis, there have been a number
of initiatives designed to leverage new technologies to collect and analyze data
and to standardize data to make it more usable. A prominent example is the
legal entity identifier (LEI) initiative. An LEI is a twenty-character, alphanumeric code that connects to key reference information about legal entities
participating in financial transactions. 224 Each LEI contains information about
an entity’s ownership structure and thus answers the questions of “who is who”
and “who owns whom.” Over a longer time horizon, this information could be
integrated with unique product identifiers (UPIs) linked to key reference information about individual financial products—from basic equity and debt to
derivatives and other more exotic instruments—thus answering the question of
“who owns what.” 225 LEIs and UPIs would then work together—with LEIs
gathering information about the parties and UPIs recording the relevant specifics of the transactions. 226
In theory, these types of developments, particularly if used in conjunction
with other new technologies, hold out a number of potentially significant benefits. More granular and standardized data can help regulators aggregate, manipulate, and compare firm-level data with the objective of identifying potential microprudential risks. This data can also be aggregated to help regulators
identify and monitor risks across sectors and over time, thus potentially becoming a critical first step to more effective macroprudential oversight. More
effective use of new technologies, along with more comprehensive data standardization, would thus give regulators more lead time to design effective, efficient, and appropriately tailored ways of addressing these risks and could
prove particularly useful in crisis management. Together, technology and data
standards can therefore be viewed as the building blocks of a more accurate
and complete map of the myriad of complex and dynamic interactions within
the financial system.
Shifting from theory to practice, however, reveals a different state of affairs. There has been some progress in data standardization and related efforts
to cut through the complexity of the financial system, but this progress has
been “slow, hard won, and, in many areas, elusive.” 227 Even low-cost im224
Richard Berner & Kathryn Judge, The Data Standardization Challenge 10 n.13 (Columbia
Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 598, 2019), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=3300&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/S5EC-CBJN].
225
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226
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227
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provements, like full adoption of the LEI, have yet to be achieved in the United States despite having been mandated throughout Europe. 228 If anything, the
low priority given to the basic building blocks necessary to realize the promise
of new technologies, such as data standardization, reveals just how far from
ideal the current regulatory process remains. 229 More generally, although the
“fintech” and “regtech” movements, 230 as well as standardization, are likely to
be critical to addressing complexity, dynamism, and unknowns, doing so will
require a very different framework for congressional and public involvement.
Looking at the potential here provides more reason for concern about the current processes undergirding financial regulation.
2. Stress Testing
One of the most important crisis-era regulatory innovations has been the
introduction of “stress testing” for the largest banking organizations. Stress
testing involves the use of hypothetical scenarios envisioning significant economic and financial shocks in order to assess how banks would fare under
those conditions and, at times, to assess the robustness of the internal systems
that banks use to monitor and constrain their own risk-taking. The Fed conducted the first large-scale supervisory stress tests in 2009, which proved critical to restoring the faith of market participants in the health of the largest bank
holding companies. Today, stress testing involves two separate but complementary processes: the Dodd-Frank mandated stress tests (DFAST) and the
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). Where these tests reveal significant weaknesses, banks may be prohibited from making distributions to shareholders, thereby increasing their capital.
The institutionalization of stress testing suggests a growing appreciation
of dynamism and unknowns and the need for new tools to address these challenges. Stress tests are forward-looking exercises that, when well executed, can
illuminate weaknesses in risk management systems, latent capital deficiencies,
and other dynamics not readily identified under more traditional approaches to
capital regulation or supervision. In many ways, they mark an important step
forward. By making capital requirements more responsive to the unique risks
banks are exposed to, and demonstrating how and when things can go wrong,
these exercises introduce helpful dynamism into the prudential regulatory re-

Id. at 14.
Id. at 4.
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gime. They can also help mitigate gamesmanship of capital adequacy requirements. 231
The growing gap between finance and financial regulation helps explain
why stress testing is such a welcome new development and provides further
support for its continued and expanded use. 232 A closer examination of stress
testing, however, reveals another gap—this one between theory and practice.
As a preliminary matter, the DFAST and CCAR stress tests only apply to a
relatively narrow subset of financial institutions, i.e., conventional deposittaking banks. Moreover, much like data standardization, this tool’s potential to
address the challenges posed by dynamism, complexity, and unknowns depends a great deal on the mindset and assumptions of the regulators involved. 233 In this respect, recent statements by Fed officials are not encouraging. When announcing the results of the 2017 tests, for example, Fed Chairman
Jerome Powell stated that the “results show that, even during a severe recession, our large banks would remain well capitalized” such that they are able to
“lend throughout the economic cycle, and support households and businesses
when times are tough.” 234 In response to the 2019 tests, this view was echoed
by Randal Quarles, the Vice-Chairman of the Fed in charge of banking supervision, when he stated that “the results confirm that our financial system remains resilient” and that “[t]he nation’s largest banks . . . would be well positioned to support the economy even after a severe shock.” 235
Other leading figures have questioned these conclusions. Former Treasury
Secretary Lawrence Summers, for example, recently observed “that recent
stress tests estimate that if GDP drops 6.25[%], unemployment doubles, the
stock market halves, and real estate falls by 25[%] to 30[%], then capital losses
would be insufficient to trigger [regulatory intervention].” 236 He went on to say
that these conclusions are “more of a comment on the inadequacies of the
231
See generally HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL STRESS TESTING (J. Doyne Farmer, Alissa Kleinnijenhuis, Til Schuermann & Thom Wetzer eds., forthcoming 2020).
232
Id.
233
Paul Krugman, The 2008 Financial Crisis as Seen from the Top, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2019),
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stress test procedures, than on the soundness of the banks.” 237 Summers’s
comments reflect an acknowledgement of the fact that the stress tests rely
heavily on models and assumptions that inevitably fail to capture the full range
of dynamics that will be at play in the thick of the next recession or financial
crisis.
We can frame the significance of these two competing views by considering, briefly, the role of “humility” in making accurate forecasts—including
stress tests. Philip Tetlock, one of the leading scholars on forecasting, has
demonstrated that experts are often exceptionally bad forecasters. 238 His work
on forecasting provides an array of relevant insights into the mindsets that enable more accurate forecasting. 239 One of the most important of these mindsets
is humility. In Tetlock’s telling, humility is not false modesty or a lack of confidence, as commonly conceived. Rather, it means understanding what one
knows and what one does not. 240
In theory, stress testing could well foster this type of humility. One of the
important features of the current stress testing process is that banks run their own
independent tests alongside those conducted by the Fed itself. Disparities in the
results of these could serve as a reminder of the inherent limitations of any risk
management framework. This is just the type of thinking that our analysis suggests is critical. But the statements by Powell and Quarles suggest a very different mindset, one that views the results as confirmations of how good things are
and how much they know—precisely the type of thinking that contributed to the
failure of regulators to foresee the cracks ahead of the last crisis. 241 Stress tests
are an important new tool in helping to mitigate the challenges this paper places
front and center, but untethered from an appreciation of those challenges, they
could do as much harm as good in preventing the next crisis.
3. Macroprudential Policies
Another post-crisis shift that would, in theory, seem even more responsive
to the challenges revealed here is the rise of a “macroprudential” tool for financial regulation.242 Macroprudential oversight was meant to address systemic risk
237
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that could not be detected, and may be accentuated, by an excessive focus on the
constitutive components of the financial system apart from the broader ecosystem in which they operate. Yet, unlike their counterparts abroad, United States
policymakers have been given few of the tools needed to implement macroprudential policies. 243 Moreover, the notion of macroprudential oversight has
evolved, in many circles, from encouraging critical and creative thinking about
the workings of the financial system as a whole to focusing on a narrower set of
specific policies, often reducing borrower leverage. 244 And as we have seen,
these very policies are now being recognized as potential triggers of behavioral
changes that have effects elsewhere in the financial system. 245 Thus, in a manner
akin to the rise of stress testing, the rise of a macroprudential approach reflects
an implicit understanding that the complexity, dynamism, and unknowns that
characterize finance undermine traditional approaches to financial regulation.
Yet, divorced from a recognition of the need for more fundamental changes to
how financial regulatory policy is made and revised, and a recognition of the
core mismatch illuminated here, macroprudential policies are unlikely to achieve
the ambitious aims originally envisioned for them.
B. Proposals for Further Reform
Just as we are not the first scholars to acknowledge the dynamism, complexity, and unknowns of modern finance, we are far from the first to raise
concerns about the processes through which law is made. Lawmaking has always been about compromise and tradeoffs, making the process almost too
easy a target. There are also numerous trans-substantive debates that bear on
the questions here at stake. Nick Bagley, for example, has raised fundamental
questions about whether there may be “too much” procedure in administrative
law, 246 a claim that aligns with the concerns we raise. Because of space condescribed by Chairman Bernanke: “The systemic orientation of the macroprudential approach may be
contrasted with that of the traditional, or ‘microprudential,’ approach to regulation and supervision,
which is concerned primarily with the safety and soundness of individual institutions, markets, or
infrastructures.” Id.
243
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straints, we make little effort to cover the range of relevant ideas and proposals
and focus instead on just a couple of the proposals that most clearly target the
concerns we raise here. The first focuses on financial regulation in particular,
and the second on a range of proposals for dealing with unknowns and related
challenges in trans-substantive ways.
1. Automatic Sunset Clauses
As described in Part II, financial regulation often has the appearance of a
single-shot game, with policymakers identifying a perceived market failure,
going through some process of engagement and deliberation, and then designing and implementing a rule aimed at eliminating this failure. 247 This is especially the case at the domestic level, where significant regulatory reforms are
often only implemented in response to financial scandals or crises. The problem, of course, is that the dynamism of finance means that regulation adopted
at any particular moment in time may not be optimal at any future point.
Moreover, complexity and unknowns—together with our own prior and competing objectives—may mean that regulation fails to advance desired objectives right from the start. This is especially the case for crisis-driven regulation: where our incomplete understanding of the problem, together with the
political, economic, and other exigencies of the crisis, often mean that regulation misses the intended target. 248
Professor Roberta Romano has written extensively about these challenges
and, on some level, many of her concerns mirror our own. Paramount among
these concerns is that too much financial regulation is passed in the immediate
wake of crises, resulting in rules that are not adequately informed and otherwise tainted by the politics of scandal and crisis. 249 She has argued that imposing mandatory “sunset” clauses on these rules could improve the quality of
financial regulation. These clauses would result in new rules automatically expiring unless reaffirmed, thus potentially compelling lawmakers to incorporate
new learning about the causes of a crisis and the consequences—intended and
otherwise—of the reforms. 250
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Yet, taking complexity, dynamism, and unknowns seriously suggests that
sunsets may well be a mixed bag, with even more potential to do harm than the
stress tests. While turning a single-shot game into a two-shot game may help
incorporate new learning and facilitate critical reassessment, it does little to
respond to the nature or pace of change within the financial system over the
longer run. Nor does it address the challenges created when the unintended
consequences of a new regulation—in banking, for example—are experienced
in other domains, such as insurance or securities. Indeed, given the propensity
for logrolling within the vetogate model, automatic sunset clauses may introduce their own adverse and unintended consequences. And, of course, while
unknowns may be particularly problematic for crisis-driven regulation, they
are also highly problematic for financial regulation adopted under less volatile
political and economic conditions. Ultimately, however, our biggest concern is
the net effect on regulation. A default rule that envisions less regulation cannot
assure smarter regulation. This is not to rule out sunset clauses as a tool that
may, at times, be warranted—but it does suggest that these clauses are not a
sufficient response to the core challenges posed by dynamism, complexity, and
pervasive unknowns.
2. Experimentalism and Experimentation
The challenges we identify as core to finance also arise, albeit in different
degrees, in an array of other domains. Accordingly, there have been a number
of efforts and proposals to try to address the uncertainty that so often plagues
attempts to produce effective regulations and enable informed discussion.
Some of these efforts have focused on experimentation, seeking to conduct
rigorous experiments that can generate the missing information prior to finalizing a new regulation or to facilitate quasi-experimentation by, for example,
allowing states to implement different rules. 251 There is much to commend
these efforts, but they remain the exception rather than the norm, in significant
part because they are feasible in only limited circumstances at this stage. There
is much in this literature that might, in time, be useful in operationalizing a
better way to address the challenges in finance that we identify as core. Going
even further, and recognizing all regulation as experimentation, is the type of
shift in mindset consistent with what we are advocating.
So far, however, advocates have tended to not embrace the experimentation approach. They remain more focused on measurable costs and benefits
251
See generally Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory Experimentation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009); Colleen V.
Chien, Rigorous Policy Pilots: Experimentation in the Administration of the Law, 104 IOWA L. REV.
2313 (2019).
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than the longer-term structural changes that we see as fundamental. This resistance reflects the challenge of using this type of methodology to assess the
impact on an outcome like the resilience of the financial system as a whole.
Even in domains where it has more obvious benefits, however, efforts to utilize
formal experimentation in rulemaking, although progressing, remain marginal
and have had only mixed success. 252
Another approach that is working quite successfully in some domains is
“experimentalism.” 253 The experimentalist framework is based on a hub-andspoke structure that combines discretion and reporting by those on the front
lines with ongoing revision of the rules by those at the center in light of new
information. This type of iterative process can yield real gains in environments
where detailed specification is difficult ex ante, and where there is some centralized mechanism that can collect, analyze, and revise rules in light of the
insights only experience can yield. 254
The concerns we raise overlap with many of the concerns motivating experimentalism. Governance mechanisms designed to “compensate for the absence of ex ante knowledge” and promote “rapid, deliberate learning from parallel and collaborative exploration of new risks and possibilities” would seem
to go a long way in addressing the challenges posed by the dynamism, complexity, and unknowns of modern finance. 255 Moreover, by critiquing the excessive efforts to optimizing a static regime, and embracing an understanding
of “[r]eliability [that] entails responsiveness, not just to strong signals like
prices but also to weak signals such as small anomalies or deviances,” experimentalism reorients the regulation discussion in ways that are critical if we are
to address the core challenges. 256
Given the importance of this work, it is all the more striking that models
akin to experimentalism have been deployed only on a limited basis and with
252
See Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 564 (2017) (using
two examples of prominent rulemakings in the environmental space to assess the upsides and downsides of policy experimentation); see also David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic
Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 546–48 (2008) (examining the inefficacy of local experimentation to generate sound policies to address poverty).
253
See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 78 (2011); see also Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism,
101 VA. L. REV. 65 (2015); Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 EUR. L.J. 271 (2008).
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Experimentalism shares a number of parallels with the work of regulatory scholars such as
Robert Baldwin and Julia Black. See, e.g., Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really Responsive Regulation, 71 MOD. L. REV. 59 (2008); Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of
Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103
(2001).
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HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL STRESS TESTING, supra note 231, at 2.
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Sabel & Simon, supra note 253, at 61.
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decidedly mixed results in the realm of finance. Consider, for example, the
discretion that the IRB approach under Basel II gave to the largest banks to use
their own risk management systems to calculate their regulatory capital requirements. The aim of this approach, like experimentalism, was to overcome
the static, coarse, and backward-looking nature of standardized capital requirements. 257 This approach also resembled the experimentalist frame in that
it enabled national regulators to harness and learn from the sophisticated risk
management systems banks instituted and to update their assessments across
firms accordingly, creating a system that theoretically could respond to challenges that neither banks nor regulators could identify and specify ex ante. The
IRB approach, which also grew out of the premise that both banks and their
regulators wanted to minimize the possibility of bank failure, hence tried to
harness an area of common interest. The results, however, were disastrous.
Although not fully implemented when the crisis hit, many view the IRB approach as a significant contributor to its severity. 258 The large investment and
commercial banks that were using this approach were among those who fared
the worst when conditions soured, and lawmakers have substantially scaled
back on the use of IRB in response. 259 The notion that shared incentives can
justify passing discretion along to those closer to the problem—whether from
international rulemaking bodies like Basel to nation states or from regulators to
banks—is among the casualties of the crisis. Whether it will be revived remains to be seen.
A related challenge is that for approaches like experimentalism to succeed, the signals going from spoke to hub must be—even if noisy—probative
of the outcomes that regulation is seeking to achieve. This feedback is what
allows for refinement over time. Yet financial markets often do not work this
way. Among the reasons that the IRB approach failed so spectacularly is that
many of the indicators that banks and their regulators focused on suggested
that banks and the broader financial system were healthy when, as we know
now, they were very far from it. Just as Minsky and others predicted, periods
257
There are some meaningful differences in the details between how Basel II’s IRB approach
worked and the functioning of the experimentalism model. Nevertheless, there was significant overlap
in the spirit and design of both models. Both aimed to enable more learning and better rules through a
more decentralized structure, in part to overcome difficulties of ex ante specification.
258
Lall, supra note 172, at 20–21 (arguing that “[f]ar from helping to avert the crisis, the [Basel
II] accord in fact directly contributed to it,” and identifying the way the IRB approach officially sanctioned flawed VaR models as a central factor behind that contribution).
259
BCBS, HIGH-LEVEL SUMMARY OF BASEL III REFORMS 5 (Dec. 2017), https://www.bis.org/
bcbs/publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/UPY2-JH2W] (explaining that one function of Basel III—the successor to Basel II—is to remove the use of IRB for certain asset classes given the fact
that “the financial crisis highlighted a number of shortcomings related to the use of internally modelled approaches for regulatory capital, including the IRB approaches to credit risk”).
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of stability changed behavior and the pricing of financial assets in ways that
ultimately made the financial system more vulnerable. 260 The feedback, in other words, provided false signals that disguised the unhealthy system. This is
part of what dooms efforts at formal experimentation, and also part of what
makes experimentalism difficult.
The experimentalist framework marks an important step forward relative
to the more traditional approaches that still dominate. Yet at this stage, the fact
that experimentalism—an approach that has worked so well in other domains—has not been used more widely in financial regulation highlights the
nature and magnitude of the underlying challenges.
V. A MORE HOLISTIC APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION
This Part complements our central claim that the mismatch between the
nature of finance and the processes through which finance is regulated sets
financial regulation up to fail by considering, in broad terms, how this challenge might be mitigated. 261 Our call is for a more holistic approach to financial regulation. The aim here is both to provide a glimmer of hope and to further illuminate the nature and magnitude of the challenge we now face by
showing what would be needed for regulation to better accommodate the realities of modern finance.
The term “holistic” is generally defined as “relating to or concerned with
wholes or with complete systems rather than with the analysis of, treatment of,
or dissection into parts.” 262 The term holism was coined by South African
statesman Jan Smuts in 1926 as part of an effort to illuminate the fundamental
limitations in western approaches to knowledge in domains like science. As he
explained, “Analysis, abstraction and generalisation are indeed necessary as
instruments of scientific understanding, but they also necessarily involve a departure from the complex concrete.” 263 The effort to bring rigor requires breaking down a complex ecosystem into more knowable parts. This has some real
benefits but also profound limitations.
Shifting from abstractions to practice, we see multiple mechanisms
through which a holistic approach to finance could improve regulatory processes and outcomes. One avenue is through changing the analytical frame
through which policy makers and others assess the landscape and options beSee supra notes 80–92 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 261–268 and accompanying text.
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Holistic, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/holistic [https://perma.cc/KG8A-2A5Z].
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J.C. SMUTS, HOLISM AND EVOLUTION 15 (MacMillan & Co., 3d ed., 1936) (1926), https://
reflexus.org/wp-content/uploads/Smut-Holism-and-Evolution.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3N8-LK46].
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fore them. As we have seen, conventional approaches typically begin with the
categorization of different species of markets and institutions. The Fed, OCC,
and FDIC regulate “banks,” the SEC regulates “securities” and “investment
funds,” and state insurance regulators regulate “insurance” firms. Reflecting
this deeply engrained path dependence, these regulatory authorities are then
charged with advancing specific objectives such as the providing for the safety
and soundness of individual institutions, ensuring the informational efficiency
of securities markets, and protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive, or
fraudulent practices. In the process, they often ignore dynamics or problems
outside their direct mandate. 264
Embracing a holistic mindset suggests that in adopting and revising the
rules governing finance, policy makers should take a broader perspective. It
would encourage regulators to see the markets and institutions they are seeking
to change as part of a vast, complex, and constantly evolving financial ecosystem that is itself part of an even more vast, complex, and evolving social system. This does not mean that all of these effects would or could be addressed,
but it would mean recognizing the potential for adverse ripples in other domains and coordinating with others earlier and more often.
A holistic mindset also brings to the fore the value of surveying the landscape for areas of opportunities or emerging, systemic issues that have not yet
congealed enough to be salient using a more conventional lens. This could take
the form of devising new ways to aggregate information currently held by different regulators to produce more complete and accurate depictions of how the
financial system current works. It could also involve developing or incorporating new metrics to assess the health of that broader ecosystem, the role and
perceptions of finance within society, and other factors. Although academics
have made some progress in this regard, as reflected by SRISK and other
measures of systemic risk, 265 regulators have not yet established mechanisms
for responding to the information embedded in these signals. This information
might be used to redefine the problems that financial regulation is designed to
address. More importantly, this process would be motivated by and reinforce
an abiding humility about how much is known and understood at any given
time. 266
264
The failure of the SEC to adequately consider the broader systemic implications of their approach toward the design and supervision of capital rules for large investment banks before the 2007–
2009 financial crisis being a prominent example. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE
OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM (2008), https://www.sec.gov/files/446-a.pdf [https://
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In time, a more holistic approach to financial regulation could be operationalized through changes in the regulation-making processes. The conventional approaches that produced Basel III, money market regulation, and other
post-crisis reforms bear all the hallmarks of a single-shot game: a malignancy
is identified, alternative treatments are weighed and measured, and the most
desirable treatment is enacted into law, fleshed out in regulation, supervised,
and enforced. Underpinning this approach is the assumption that policymakers
can and should prescribe the optimal course of treatment—that they can “get it
right.” This assumption is evident in procedural rules—statutory or agency
requirements for CBA being one prominent example—that are ostensibly designed to ensure a degree of certainty around the impact of new regulation. It is
also evident in the absence of institutional mechanisms designed to periodically assess the impact of new regulation after it comes into force. Yet, as our case
studies illustrate, policymakers almost inevitably fail to accurately predict the
impact of their decisions: not simply because they “get it wrong,” but because
these decisions unleash consequences that would have been almost impossible
to predict at any point during the process of designing new regulation. 267
In contrast, a defining feature of a holistic approach is the recognition that
regulation functions as a continuous game. This has two important implications.
The first is the necessity of institutional mechanisms designed to facilitate the
aggregation, analysis, and dissemination of information with a view to promoting ongoing learning within the regulatory community. The function of these
mechanisms would not be limited to simply evaluating the costs and benefits of
new regulation. Instead, these mechanisms would seek to monitor and evaluate
ongoing structural changes to the financial system, assess the impact and effectiveness of new regulation, and better understand the role and perceptions of finance within wider society. This in turn leads to the second implication—the
need for flexibility in the processes governing the formulation, adoption, and
revision of regulation. This flexibility is essential in order to ensure that new information is incorporated into the decision-making process and, ultimately, reflected in new regulation. 268 Together, these processes reflect the view that
change is both inevitable and endogenous, and that, therefore, efforts to optimize
financial regulation are akin to building castles in the sky.
Another related benefit of a more holistic approach is that, properly operationalized, it could help to address the legitimacy and accountability issues
that continue to loom large in finance. The complexity of the financial system
See supra notes 124–222 and accompanying text.
It is at this point that the distinction between macroprudential and holistic approaches becomes
most evident. Although the creation of institutions such as the OFR and FSOC may initially appear to
reflect a holistic approach, their institutional design imposes significant constraints on their ability to
collect information, feed it into the policy process, and, ultimately, act on the basis of it.
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not only means that rules often have unforeseen consequences, but it also
means that those who are not financial experts have a marked disadvantage in
regulatory debates. The result, too often, is disengagement and distrust. By
compelling reconsideration of policy tradeoffs both before and after a crisis
arises—when there is more meaningful information available about the actual
effects of a contested rule or scheme—there is at least the possibility of broader engagement and feedback.
Lastly, a more holistic approach to financial regulation might also yield
different outputs than the current regime. As vividly illustrated by the development of the Basel capital and liquidity rules, the ongoing quest for optimization has led to the adoption of an increasingly rigid and complex regulatory
rulebook. This rulification is a product of pervasive regulatory arbitrage, the
resulting reluctance on the part of elected officials to allocate discretion to either regulatory authorities or market participants, and the misplaced belief
that—in time—policymakers will be able to strike the optimal balance between competing priorities and objectives. By abandoning the idea that this
type of optimization is possible, holistic approaches would enable regulators to
adopt a more pragmatic stance: one based not on the tired “rules versus discretion” debate, but on their experiences of how these different tools work (or do
not) in various regulatory contexts. By the same token, knowing that regulators
have the flexibility to adapt rules in response to changing circumstances may
also reduce the incentives of market participants to invest significant resources
in finding ways to circumvent them. In this way, more holistic approaches are
arguably less likely to produce regulatory rulebooks that contribute to the dynamism and complexity of the financial system.
CONCLUSION
Examining the processes that undergird financial regulation in light of the
realities of modern finance helps to explain why the resulting rules so often fail
to achieve their purported aims. This mismatch also helps explain why so
many Americans remain distrustful of Congress and others charged with making these rules, in addition to the financial sector they regulate. Efforts to improve financial regulation must grapple more directly with these fundamental
process failures. There are no easy answers, and this Article does not purport to
provide them. Nonetheless, this Article does suggest that a more holistic mindset could help mitigate many of these challenges, and that, given the sheer
magnitude of the mismatch between the nature of modern finance and the processes through which it is regulated, a profound shift is needed.

